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ABSTRACT 
For much of its history, the Supreme Court applied a very strong presumption of constitutionality 
in favor of federal statutes, striking them down only if convinced the statute was unconstitutional 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  In more modern cases, however, the Court affords a much weaker 
“presumption of constitutionality” that is closer to a mere tiebreaker, does not apply to all 
constitutional challenges, and affords only factual, not interpretive deference.  This Article argues 
for adjusting the presumption of constitutionality based on the margin of statutory passage, and 
setting as the maximum the older, stronger beyond-rational-doubt presumption.  Adjusting the 
presumption based on the margin of passage addresses the concerns behind the 
“countermajoritarian difficulty.”  It is supported by the Constitution’s supermajoritarian 
structures and theorists’ arguments about the superiority of supermajority enactments.  It would 
improve the Court’s legitimacy by making explicit and legitimate a basis of decision that has been 
perceived to have influenced the Court’s decision making in key cases.  It would also be more 
objective than various theories advanced to allow the Court to accommodate popular will in 
constitutional interpretation, and would be easier to implement than legislative proposals to “fix” 
the countermajoritarian difficulty, because it can be implemented by the Court itself. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article argues that the presumption of constitutionality that 
federal courts apply when reviewing federal statutes should strength-
en based on the margin of passage in Congress, rising towards a 
“Thayerian”1 maximum at which the Supreme Court would uphold a 
statute unless it were proven unconstitutional beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Increasing deference based on the margin of passage would 
further democratic and majoritarian values, reducing the much-
discussed “countermajoritarian difficulty” caused by judicial review by 
advancing the principle of respect for majority legislation that is one 
of the main justifications for the presumption of constitutionality.  
Deferring more to statutes that pass with more votes is also consistent 
with the Constitution’s own supermajoritarian provisions and sup-
ported by academic theories about supermajorities’ and multi-
member legislatures’ superior ability to enact good laws and resolve 
contested constitutional questions.  Further, adjusting the presump-
tion based on the margin of passage would improve popular percep-
tions of judicial legitimacy, both by making the Court more deferen-
tial to more popular laws and by explicitly acknowledging as a 
legitimate basis of decision a factor widely perceived to have tacitly 
influenced the Court’s decision making in important cases. 
Part I explains the background of the “countermajoritarian diffi-
culty” and of the presumption of statutory constitutionality rooted (at 
least in part) in countermajoritarian concerns.  It also introduces the 
basic idea of an adjustable presumption of constitutionality tied to 
the margin of statutory passage. 
Part II gives arguments for the basic idea that the presumption of 
constitutionality gets stronger with the margin of statutory passage.  
Part III considers how an adjustable presumption of constitutionality 
could work, arguing for a maximum Thayerian presumption requir-
 
 1 James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
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ing the Court to uphold a statute unless proven unconstitutional be-
yond a reasonable doubt and including significant deference to Con-
gress’s constitutional interpretation, and a minimum mere-tiebreaker 
presumption without interpretive deference.  Part III also considers 
when the presumption would apply and in what types of cases it 
might make the most difference.  In particular, Part III limits the ap-
plication of the proposal to those areas where the Court currently 
applies a presumption of constitutionality, which excludes challenges 
based on claimed violations of fundamental rights or claimed invidi-
ous discrimination against discrete minorities. 
Part IV responds to potential objections, including arguments that 
such an approach would be non-textual or unprecedented, problems 
with ascertaining the margin of passage for federal statutes, and skep-
ticism about the chances that the Supreme Court would embrace 
such a rule.  Part V concludes by discussing possible future areas of 
inquiry. 
I.  THE COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY AND THE PRESUMPTION OF 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
A.  The Countermajoritarian Difficulty 
The countermajoritarian difficulty is very familiar—indeed, it is 
generally acknowledged and sometimes bemoaned as the “central ob-
session” of constitutional scholarship over the past half-century.2  The 
basic concern is that allowing unelected judges to overturn the acts of 
elected legislatures frustrates democratic principles and the Constitu-
tion’s preference for republican lawmaking.3  Alexander Bickel 
coined the phrase “countermajoritarian difficulty” to describe this 
problem.4  Since Bickel, legal theorists have debated extensively 
whether there is really a problem and (if there is) about how it might 
be solved, resolved, dissolved, or ameliorated. 
 
 2 See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One:  The Road 
to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334 (1998) (“The ‘countermajoritarian diffi-
culty’ has been the central obsession of modern constitutional scholarship.”); Neal Ku-
mar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1709 (1998) (“Contemporary 
constitutional law is preoccupied with the antidemocratic nature of judicial review.”).  
The following discussion attempts to briefly summarize the debates over the counterma-
joritarian difficulty, not comprehensively describe them. 
 3 See, e.g., ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–18 (1962); Barry Fried-
man, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2596 (2003) (“At bottom 
it often seems to be a claim . . . that when judges invalidate governmental decisions based 
upon constitutional requirements, they act contrary to the preferences of the citizenry.”). 
 4 See BICKEL, supra note 3, at 33. 
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Theories of the difficulty, and related attacks on the principle of 
judicial review, have taken several forms.  These have included textu-
al arguments that judicial review is illegitimate because it is not men-
tioned in the Constitution5 and originalist arguments that judicial re-
view is illegitimate because it was not contemplated by the Framers or 
ratifiers and deviates from the model of popular constitutionalism 
that prevailed when and shortly after the Constitution was ratified.6  
Other critics have argued more modestly that even if judicial review is 
theoretically legitimate, the Court has wrongly increased how often it 
uses the power—from very rarely during its first century7 to much 
more frequently today, especially since the 1960s and perhaps accel-
erating even further in the last two decades.8 
Beyond arguments that the Constitution does not (or did not 
originally) authorize judicial review, countermajoritarian criticisms 
also include philosophical arguments that judicial review is unjustifi-
able because it is procedurally illegitimate and not demonstratively 
substantively superior to legislative deliberation as a way of resolving 
contested issues about rights and constitutional interpretation.9 
 
 5 E.g., Joseph D. Grano, Judicial Review and a Written Constitution in a Democratic Society, 28 
WAYNE L. REV. 1, 16 (1981) (“[T]he weight of evidence does not support the view that the 
framers, who had taken the extraordinary step of adopting a [written] constitution as a 
species of positive law, intended the judiciary to have such broad authority [of judicial re-
view].”). 
 6 E.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:  POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (2004); Larry D. Kramer, Foreword:  We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 
5–6 (2001) (describing how the early Supreme Court took the modest position that its in-
terpretations were not to be superior to the interpretations by the other branches and 
demonstrating that the idea of judicial supremacy was not popular in the early nine-
teenth century). 
 7 The Court struck down only two federal statutes as unconstitutional before the Civil War.  
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 432 (1856) (holding that the Missouri Com-
promise Act was unconstitutional); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 138 
(1803) (finding that a section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional).  For an 
early academic expression of this concern, see Joseph L. Lewinson, Limiting Judicial Review 
by Act of Congress, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 591, 591 (1935) (stating that the Court’s invalidation 
of four federal statutes in 1934 was an unprecedented “mortality rate”).  But see Keith E. 
Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Before the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1257–58 
(2009) (arguing that the standard story is wrong and that antebellum invalidation of fed-
eral statutes was actually more robust than generally thought). 
 8 See Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court Supermajority Rule:  
Lessons from the Past, 78 IND. L.J. 73, 74 (2003) (“This recent burst of decisions invalidating 
federal statutory provisions [by the Rehnquist Court], particularly by bare-majority rule, is 
historically anomalous.”). 
 9 See, e.g., RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM:  A REPUBLICAN DEFENSE OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY 2–3(2007); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case 
Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1353 (2006) (“[Judicial review] is politically il-
legitimate, so far as democratic values are concerned:  By privileging majority voting 
among a small number of unelected and unaccountable judges, it disenfranchises ordi-
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Defenses of judicial review, or denials of the countermajoritarian 
difficulty, have similarly taken several forms.  Originalist criticisms 
have been countered by scholars arguing that judicial review was in-
deed envisioned by the Framers from the beginning.10  Others have 
argued there can be no countermajoritarian problem because the 
Constitution’s structure (which was itself ratified by democratic pro-
cesses) specifically anticipates, or requires, judicial review.11  To the 
extent that judicial review is undemocratic in the present, that is a 
“feature, not a bug.”12  Beyond arguments based in the Constitution’s 
text or history, others have justified the power because of its tendency 
to protect important values—such as keeping the political process 
open to all, safeguarding the fundamental rights enshrined in the 
Constitution, or preserving federalism restrictions.  They have sug-
gested correspondingly that judicial review should be limited to or 
heightened for challenges that implicate these values.13 
Outside the realm of theory, scholars have also argued that the 
theoretical concern about countermajoritarianism is empirically inva-
lid because the Court does, in fact, conform itself (perhaps with some  
 
 
nary citizens and brushes aside cherished principles of representation and political equal-
ity in the final resolution of issues about rights.”). 
 10 E.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 
887, 892 (2003) (“[W]e believe that modern scholars who insist that the Founders never 
authorized judicial review of federal statutes are mistaken.”); see also Thayer, supra note 1, 
at 132–34 (tracing the evolution of judicial review in state constitutions prior to and just 
after the Founding). 
 11 See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1380 (1997) (arguing that the Constitution, and the mechanism 
of judicial review, are designed “to remove a series of transcendent questions from short-
term majoritarian control”). 
 12 Cf. Mark Tushnet, Abolishing Judicial Review, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 581, 582 n.6 (2011) 
(emphasizing that, under Tushnet’s proposal for abolishing judicial review, “the fact that 
Congress might expressly authorize actions that courts exercising the power of judicial 
review would find unconstitutional is a feature, not a bug”). 
 13 E.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103 
(1980) (arguing that judicial review’s proper role is correcting failures of democratic rep-
resentation); Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1709 (2008) (“[T]he strongest case for judicial review . . . [is that] er-
rors that result in the underenforcement of rights are more troubling than errors that re-
sult in their overenforcement, and judicial review may provide a distinctively valuable 
hedge against errors of underenforcement . . . .”).  Compare Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword:  
Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 64 (2012) (criticizing the Roberts Court’s dis-
dainful skepticism of the political process as particularly dangerous because it is com-
bined with a narrow construction of key enumerated powers); with Steven G. Calabresi, 
The Constitution and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 13, 14 (2012) (responding to Karlan 
with an argument that judicial review in federalism cases is not countermajoritarian be-
cause the Court is merely umpiring between federal and state majorities). 
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lag) to majority political preferences, and so actually is itself a demo-
cratic, majoritarian institution.14  Some have contended that judicial 
review is not countermajoritarian because it is a “politically construct-
ed” phenomenon assented to and encouraged by the elected branch-
es of the government and, therefore, not meaningfully undemocrat-
ic.15  Others have argued that the antidemocratic concerns driving the 
countermajoritarian difficulty are unfounded because Congress itself, 
or the constitutional system more generally, distort and thwart actual 
majoritarian policy preferences.16  Indeed, some argue that the Court 
can even serve as an outlet to effect majority preferences thwarted by 
countermajoritarian flaws in the representativeness of Congress or 
inherent in the Constitution’s republican structure.17 
Among those who feel that the difficulty is real, theorists have 
proposed a wide variety of solutions to solve, resolve, or dissolve the 
difficulty.  These often include proposals to limit the scope of judicial 
 
 14 See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court?  
Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263, 263–64 (2010) (suggesting 
that Justices’ views generally track public opinion); Friedman, supra note 3, at 2606 
(“[T]he wealth of existing evidence suggests that most of the time judicial decisions fall 
within the range of acceptability that one might expect of the agents of popular govern-
ment.”); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritari-
an Institution?  The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
87, 96 (1993) (finding that Supreme Court opinions track public preference with a 5–7 
year time lag).  But see, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institu-
tion?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 117 (arguing that the modern majoritarian view of the 
Court has been pushed to unrealistic and troubling extremes and that the Court has 
stood dramatically, in some instances, against majoritarian views). 
 15 See generally, e.g., KEITH WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
(2007); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 
VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian Difficulty:  From Courts to 
Congress to Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 361, 363–64 (2008) (collecting 
and summarizing literature on the challenges to the countermajoritarian perception of 
the relationship between Justices and elected officials). 
 16 Scholars arguing that Congress is itself countermajoritarian focus on political polariza-
tion, defects in representation resulting from political gerrymandering, and problems 
arising from the influence of special interests.  See Graber, supra note 15, at 373–75 (de-
scribing countermajoritian problems with Congress and the President).  Countermajori-
tarian critics of the constitutional structure focus on the Electoral College, the nonma-
joritarian, federal structure of the Senate, and the onerous requirements for amending 
the Constitution under Article V.  E.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION:  WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN 
CORRECT IT) (2006) (describing both the theoretical and practical ramifications of the 
Senate's disproportionate representation); Graber, supra note 15, at 376–79 (reviewing 
arguments that American electoral institutions suffer from these and other counterma-
joritarian problems). 
 17 See Graber, supra note15, at 373 (“If . . . an off-center president is more conservative than 
the general public and a malapportioned Senate is more liberal then [sic] the general 
public, then courts may actually improve the democratic performance of governing insti-
tutions.”). 
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review or to make it more difficult for courts to exercise that power to 
overturn statutes.18  Some theorists argue for limiting or revising judi-
cial review in a way favoring the theorist’s policy preferences by limit-
ing or increasing its application in certain substantive areas of law.19  
Others have made more neutral proposals for overall structural limi-
tations on how the Supreme Court exercises the power—such as re-
quiring more than a bare majority vote before the Court can overturn 
a statute or allowing Congress, by supermajority vote, to override ju-
dicial invalidation of a statute.20  Theorists of reform have also made 
more drastic proposals to abolish judicial review altogether.21  Of the-
se proposals, however, none have been generally accepted as satisfac-
tory by commentators, much less adopted by Congress or endorsed 
by the courts.  And, the prevailing view is that judicial review is suffi-
ciently well-entrenched that it is not going anywhere.22 
One reason for this is that the Court itself does not seem to share 
any of the more radical concerns about the countermajoritarian 
 
 18 E.g., Caminker, supra note 8, at 97–101 (examining a six-vote requirement for the Court 
to invalidate a statute as a “corporate” mechanism of deference that could replace or 
supplement the “atomistic” mechanism of Thayerian deference); see generally Maurice S. 
Culp, A Survey of the Proposals to Limit or Deny the Power of Judicial Review by the Supreme Court 
of the United States, 4 IND. L.J. 386 (1929) (collecting and categorizing examples of pro-
posals to limit the Court’s judicial review authority up to 1929). 
 19 See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 8, at 73 (considering supermajority requirements for the 
Supreme Court’s invalidation of statutes as a response to the power of the “Federalism 
Five,” a group of Justices particularly aggressive in their exercise of judicial review over 
federal statutes challenged on federalism grounds); Fallon, supra note 13, at 1730–31 (ar-
guing that judicial review should be limited in areas where there are conflicts between as-
sertions of fundamental rights); see also Randy Barnett, The Disdain Campaign, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. F. 1, 11 (2012) (criticizing these approaches as “restraint for thee, but not for 
me”). 
 20 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH:  MODERN LIBERALISM AND 
AMERICAN DECLINE 117, 321 (1996) (arguing for a constitutional amendment allowing 
Congress to override decisions of the Supreme Court); Caminker, supra note 8, at 78 
(suggesting exploration of a congressional imposition of a supermajority rule on the 
Court); Joseph L. Lewinson, Limiting Judicial Review by Act of Congress, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 
591, 595–98 (1935) (considering whether Congress could take away the Court’s jurisdic-
tion to declare laws unconstitutional); see generally Culp, supra note 18 (collecting various 
proposals to limit the power of judicial review made during the first 140 years of the Na-
tion’s history). 
 21 See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 154–76 
(1999); Tushnet, supra note 12, at 581 (proposing a constitutional amendment to abolish 
judicial review by forbidding courts from reviewing the constitutionality of any act of 
Congress). 
 22 E.g., ETHAN LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA:  A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR 
BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 70 (2004) (“[J]udicial review is here to stay.”). 
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problem potentially caused by judicial review.23  Since Marbury v. Mad-
ison,24 the Court itself has justified the practice as rooted in the 
Court’s own duties and role under the Constitution.25  Moreover, the 
modern trend is for the Court to be less deferential to elected legisla-
tures, in terms of how frequently (and how ideologically) it invali-
dates statutes for unconstitutionality.26 
While the Court itself has not engaged in extensive theoretical 
discussion about the countermajoritarian difficulty, it has frequently 
acknowledged the dangers inherent in exercising its power to over-
turn the acts of elected legislators.27  And, the Court has developed a 
variety of ways to limit its exercise of that power—including doctrines 
like constitutional avoidance,28 jurisprudential approaches such as 
“judicial minimalism,”29 and practices of selectivity in deciding which 
cases to take.30  Among these self-restraining doctrines is the pre-
sumption of constitutionality that the Court affords to federal stat-
utes.31  This presumption of constitutionality is the main focus of this 
Article and is examined further in Part I.B. 
At the same time, however, the Court also has expressed concerns 
about bowing to political pressure when considering (and reconsider-
ing) its decisions, and has indicated that altering its rulings based on 
 
 23 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 519, 
534–38 (2012) (arguing that there are no current Supreme Court Justices following a ju-
risprudential philosophy of strong deference to Congress). 
 24 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 25 But see Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetorical Uses of Marbury v. Madison:  The Emergence of a 
“Great Case,” 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 375, 376–77 (2003) (noting that Marbury was not 
commonly cited by the Court as authority for the power of judicial review prior to 1887). 
 26 See Caminker, supra note 8, at 84–85 (tracing the decline from very strong “Thayer” def-
erence to something much less today); Posner, supra note 23, at 522–35 (describing the 
popularity of Thayer’s theory of judicial restraint and the eventual end of the Thayerian 
tradition).  See also discussion infra Part I.B. 
 27 E.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012) (“It is not our job 
to protect the people from the consequences of their political choices.”). 
 28 See, e.g., Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 129 S. Ct. 2504, 
2513 (2009) (describing how the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there 
is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case). 
 29 Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., Commencement Address at Georgetown University Law 
Center (May 21, 2006) (“If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, in my 
view it is necessary not to decide more.”). 
 30 See, e.g., H. W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE:  AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 6 (1992) (noting the Court’s nearly complete power to set its own agen-
da). 
 31 See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 30 (1944) (Reed, J., dissenting) (“The presump-
tion of constitutionality of statutes is a safeguard wisely conceived to keep courts within 
constitutional bounds in the exercise of their extraordinary power of judicial review.”). 
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such pressure would harm the Court’s legitimacy.32  And, as a practi-
cal matter, the Court’s enthusiasm for invalidating federal statutes as 
unconstitutional does not seem to have diminished significantly in 
recent years—if anything, it may have increased.33 
This Article accepts the twin premises that there is a counterma-
joritarian difficulty and that judicial review is so firmly entrenched in 
the constitutional order that it is here to stay for the foreseeable fu-
ture.  This Article, therefore, does not seek to add to the extensive 
debates over whether there actually is a countermajoritarian prob-
lem, but its argument for adjusting the presumption of constitution-
ality based on statutory margins is most likely to appeal to those who 
think that there is.  Specifically, this Article focuses on the argument 
that if there is a countermajoritarian difficulty, it is more difficult 
when the margin of statutory passage is larger.  If judicial review is 
questionable or illegitimate because it thwarts popular will, the 
thwarting is worse, and more undemocratic, when a larger majority in 
Congress supports the statute’s passage.  This point is developed fur-
ther in Part II. 
This observation leads directly to this Article’s suggestion for a re-
sponsive adjustment to the doctrine:  the Supreme Court should ad-
just the presumption of constitutionality that it applies to federal 
statutes so that it is stronger for statutes passed by larger margins.  Ad-
justing the presumption of constitutionality in this way would more 
effectively limit the potential antidemocratic harms caused by the 
Court’s exercise of its power of judicial review.  In the next Subpart, 
this Article summarizes the history, content, and contradictions of the 
Supreme Court’s doctrine of the presumption of constitutionality for 
federal statutes, as the second piece of background for the main ar-
gument. 
 
 32 E.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey¸ 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (“[T]o overrule 
under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed deci-
sion would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious question.”). 
 33 The Supreme Court declared 159 statutes unconstitutional, in whole or in part, between 
1789 and 2002—about .75 per year overall, but about .02 per year pre-1865, and 1.14 per 
year post-1865.  See S. Doc. No. 108-17, at 2117–59 (2004) (listing and describing these 
159 federal statutes held unconstitutional and the basis for their invalidation).  Since 
2002, the Court has declared an additional nine statutes unconstitutional, in whole or in 
part—about one per term.  See Thomas M. Keck, Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate Fed-
eral Statutes?, MAXWELL SCH. OF SYRACUSE UNIV., http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/tmkeck/
Book_1/federal_statutes.htm (last updated June 27, 2013) (updating research on why 
federal statutes have been struck down).  See also Caminker, supra note 8, at 74 (noting 
that from 1995 to 2002, the rate of Supreme Court invalidation of federal statutes in-
creased significantly, as did the proportion of those decisions decided by a bare 5-4 ma-
jority). 
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B.  The Presumption of Constitutionality 
The Supreme Court has long applied a presumption of constitu-
tionality in favor of federal statutes, but the presumption has both 
weakened and narrowed over time. 
The presumption of constitutionality is often classified under the 
broader heading of “judicial restraint,” together with other principles 
like “judicial minimalism”—the idea that a court should decide cases 
as narrowly as possible, in ways that are incompletely theorized34—
and doctrines like “constitutional avoidance”—the rule that a court 
should, when possible, avoid answering difficult constitutional ques-
tions by disposing of cases on non-constitutional grounds.35  As dis-
cussed above, these theories and doctrines are designed to restrain 
the Court’s exercise of judicial review because of concerns about the 
countermajoritarian dangers inherent in that power. 
Since its early days, the Court has applied some sort of a presump-
tion of constitutionality in favor of both federal and state statutes, 
although the specific label “presumption of constitutionality” only 
was applied later.36  At the most basic level, the presumption of consti-
tutionality simply means that in evaluating the constitutionality of a 
statute, the Court will afford some deference to the statute, and the 
party challenging the statute will bear some burden of proof to show 
its unconstitutionality. 
The Court’s opinions, as well as academic explanations of the pre-
sumption of constitutionality, have justified it, at least in part, by the 
principle of deferring to the will of legislative majorities.37  That is, 
 
 34 E.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME:  JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 9 (2001). 
 35 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by 
the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be dis-
posed of.”); see, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick, Rethinking the Presumption of Constitutionality, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1447, 1448 n.2 (2010) (grouping the presumption of constitutionali-
ty together with other restraining doctrines such as constitutional avoidance). 
 36 The first use of the specific phrase “presumption of constitutionality” was in In re Kemmler, 
136 U.S. 436, 442 (1890), where it was used to describe the application of the presump-
tion by a state court.  The first use of the phrase by a Justice describing it as a doctrine of 
the Court was in The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548, 575 (1914), where Justice McKenna re-
ferred to “the presumption of constitutionality to which all legislation is entitled . . . .”  
The first case in which a majority of the Court used the specific phrase in actually apply-
ing the presumption is O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257–
58 (1931)—but in doing so, it cited, in a footnote, cases stretching back to Close v. Glen-
wood Cemetery, 107 U.S. 466, 475 (1883). 
 37 See, e.g., Middleton v. Tex. Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 157 (1919) (“There is a 
strong presumption that a legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of 
its own people . . . .”); Caminker, supra note 8, at 83–86 (describing three reasons for the 
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the presumption has roots in the same concerns about unelected 
judges invalidating elected legislatures’ enactments that animate the 
perceived countermajoritarian difficulty.38  In addition, the Court and 
theorists also justify the presumption on the grounds that Congress 
has an independent duty to consider the Constitution when it legis-
lates; that by passing a statute, Congress has presumptively concluded 
that it is indeed constitutional; and that the Court should give some 
deference to this conclusion.39  As explained further in Part II, both 
of these justifications support adjusting the presumption of constitu-
tionality so that it strengthens as the margin of statutory passage gets 
larger. 
While the justifications offered for the presumption of constitu-
tionality seem to have remained fairly constant, the application of the 
presumption has changed throughout the Court’s history—
weakening and narrowing in several significant ways. 
First, the strength of the presumption has weakened.  This weak-
ening is suggested both by shifts in the language that the Court has 
used to describe the presumption and by the significant modern in-
crease in the rate at which the Court has invalidated federal statutes.  
In earlier cases, the Court applied a very strong presumption, fre-
quently framed as requiring that the invalidity of the statute be shown 
beyond a reasonable or “rational” doubt40 or requiring a “clear show-
ing” of unconstitutionality.41  Until the early twentieth century, this 
 
presumption given by Thayer himself, and four others given by scholars in more recent 
work); Hessick, supra note 35, at 1469–72 (describing the “democratic accountability” ra-
tionale as one purpose of the presumption); Thayer, supra note 1, at 144, 151, 156. 
 38 The Court also presumes state statutes constitutional, but that presumption is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
 39 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (justifying the presumption 
based on Congress’s right and duty to “make its own informed judgment on the meaning 
and force of the Constitution”). 
 40 See Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878) (“Every possible presumption is in favor 
of the validity of a statute, and this continues until the contrary is shown beyond a ration-
al doubt.”); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 270 (1827) (“It is but a decent respect due to 
the . . . legislative body, by which any law is passed, to presume in favor of its validity, until 
its violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable doubt.”); see also Hessick, 
supra note 35, at 1457 n.48 (collecting examples of the Court employing the beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard for constitutionality questions); Thayer, supra note 1, at 140–
49 (collecting early cases from the Supreme Court and state courts articulating and apply-
ing the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt version of the presumption). 
 41 Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 531 (1871) (“A decent respect for a co-
ordinate branch of the government demands that the judiciary should presume, until the 
contrary is clearly shown, that there has been no transgression of power by Con-
gress . . . .”); Kramer, Foreword:  We the Court, supra note 6, at 79 (“Judicial review was . . . a 
power to be employed cautiously, only where the unconstitutionality of a law was clear 
beyond doubt . . . .”). 
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very strong presumption of constitutionality was treated by the Court 
as venerable and unquestionable:  “This court, by an unbroken line 
of decisions from Chief Justice Marshall to the present day, has stead-
ily adhered to the rule that every possible presumption is in favor of 
the validity of an act of Congress until overcome beyond rational 
doubt.”42 
Over time, however, the Court has become less enthusiastic about 
proclaiming that the presumption is strong,43 and appeals to the 
strength of the presumption have become increasingly relegated to 
dissenting opinions.44  The modern Court will occasionally describe 
the presumption as requiring as much as a “plain showing that Con-
gress has exceeded its constitutional bounds,”45 but the “beyond ra-
tional doubt” formulation has disappeared.  Moreover, at times, some 
Justices on the modern Court seem to view the presumption as a 
mere tiebreaker that will only prompt a vote to uphold the statute if 
other considerations are in equipoise.46  In general, most agree that 
the trend has been away from the strongest, Thayerian form of defer-
ence to Congress.47  And, empirical assessments of trends in the 
 
 42 Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 544 (1923). 
 43 For example, while there are nine majority decisions between 1931 and 1984 describing 
the presumption of constitutionality afforded federal statutes as “strong,” see, for exam-
ple, United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416 (1976), as well as many earlier decisions ap-
plying the beyond-a-rational-doubt version, no majority decisions since 1984 mention a 
“strong” presumption of constitutionality. 
 44 See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 267 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(wishing to uphold a statute’s constitutionality except in the “clear and urgent case”); 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 
304, 327 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing a strong presumption of constitu-
tionality); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 675 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Con-
gressional enactments come to this Court with an extremely heavy presumption of validi-
ty.”); Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 93 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (“This is so because of the very weighty presumption of constitutionality that I 
deem is essential to attribute to any Act of Congress.”). 
 45 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000). 
 46 See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 110 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring) (“What tips the 
scale for me is the presumption of constitutionality normally accorded a State’s law.  That 
presumption gives the State the benefit of the doubt in close cases like this one, and on 
that basis alone I concur in the Court’s judgment.”); see also Caminker, supra note 8, at 
115 (“[In the Rehnquist court,] the boilerplate ‘presumption of constitutionality’ has ap-
parently become a meaningless mantra.”). 
 47 See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 8, at 86 (“[A] succinctly phrased ‘presumption of constitu-
tionality’ is all today’s Congress gets [under modern doctrine].”); Timothy P. O’Neill, 
Harlan on My Mind:  Chief Justice Roberts and the Affordable Care Act, 3 CALIF. L. REV. CIRCUIT 
170, 177–80 (2012) (identifying the second Justice Harlan as the Court’s last practitioner 
of full Thayerian deference); Posner, supra note 23, at 546 (“[Thayerism’s] judicial de-
mise is attributable to the exuberant activism of the Warren Court . . . .”). 
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Court’s invalidation of statutes (analyzing how frequently, and for 
what reasons) seem to also support this view.48 
Second, the scope of application of the presumption has nar-
rowed in two different ways.  One is that the modern presumption 
has become limited to questions of evidentiary support and does not 
extend to questions of interpretation.  Under the earlier, stronger 
presumption doctrine, the Court applied a presumption of constitu-
tionality in favor of the statute on both interpretive and fact ques-
tions.49  Now, however, the application of the presumption seems to 
be largely limited to giving the statute the benefit of the doubt on 
questions of constitutional fact-finding, with no interpretive defer-
ence.50 
Relatedly, the Court seems to have reduced the scope of the pre-
sumption of constitutionality by limiting the substantive areas of con-
stitutional law where it applies.51  This retraction and its extent are 
more debatable or unclear.  The Court does still sometimes assert 
that the presumption of constitutionality applies in “all” cases.52  
 
 48 As noted above, supra note 7, the Court invalidated only two federal statutes as unconsti-
tutional between 1789 and 1865.  Scholars have suggested that the pace and nature of in-
validation accelerated significantly under the Warren Court.  See Lee Epstein & William 
M. Landes, Was There Ever Such a Thing as Judicial Self-Restraint?, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 557, 
569–77 (2012) (finding that Justices appointed pre-1952 hesitated to strike down laws re-
gardless of ideological agreement, while those appointed post-1952 have been opportun-
istic in their restraint); Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Is the Roberts Court Especially Activ-
ist?  A Study of Invalidating (and Upholding) Federal, State, and Local Laws, 61 EMORY L.J. 737 
(2012) (arguing, based on an empirical study, that the Roberts Court is not especially ac-
tivist for the post-1969 era).  But see Aziz Z. Huq, When Was Judicial Self-Restraint?, 100 
CALIF. L. REV. 579, 599 (2012) (“[I]t may be that the true inception of judicial activism 
was at the end of the Civil War, not the opening of the Civil Rights era.”). 
 49 See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810) (requiring a “strong convic-
tion of . . . incompatibility” between Constitution and law); Hessick, supra note 35, at 1457 
n.48 (providing other examples). 
 50 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7 (“It is thus a ‘permanent and indispensable feature of our 
constitutional system’ that ‘the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of 
the Constitution.” (internal citations omitted)); Hessick, supra note 35, at 1449. 
 51 See Caminker, supra note 8, at 85 (describing the Court’s division of the “constitutional 
terrain” into areas of strong and weak deference, starting roughly with its decision in 
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). 
 52 E.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 442 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is 
true as well, as the Court observes, that a presumption of constitutionality attaches to eve-
ry Act of Congress.”); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (suggesting that all 
acts of Congress are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality).  Some suggest that 
the Court does apply the presumption to all cases, in the basic sense of giving the chal-
lenger the burden of proof, but “how high” the burden is—i.e., how strong the presump-
tion of constitutionality is—is “not consistent” between different types of constitutional 
challenges, or even from case to case.  See Orin Kerr, More on the Presumption of Constitu-
tionality, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 30, 2011 12:12 p.m.), 
http://www.volokh.com/2011/06/30/more-on-the-presumption-of-constitutionality.  
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However, these assertions seem to be made frequently in procedural 
contexts, such as when the Court reverses lower court refusals to stay 
injunctions of federal statutes on the theory that the presumption of 
constitutionality tips the balance of harms towards staying the injunc-
tion pending appeal.53 
Moreover, the Court has repeatedly and explicitly stated in the 
mid-to-late-twentieth century that the presumption is weakened, is 
lessened, or does not apply in many different contexts—including 
challenges involving fundamental rights, separation-of-powers issues, 
rights to political representation, and equal-protection challenges in-
volving the rights of minorities.54  Indeed, in certain contexts, such as 
First Amendment challenges to content-based speech restrictions, the 
Court has made clear that the presumption not only does not apply, 
but is actually reversed.55  Thus, the uncontested or unqualified appli-
 
Others contend that the Court frequently simply does not apply the presumption at all.  
See Ilya Somin, The Presumption of Constitutionality Revisited, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 30, 
2011 1:06 p.m.), http://www.volokh.com/2011/06/30/the-presumption-of-
constitutionality-revisited (“[T]he Court routinely ignores the presumption in cases 
where it strikes down federal laws.”). 
 53 See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 483 U.S. 1304, 1304 (1987) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (stay-
ing the district court order declaring the act unconstitutional because “[t]he presump-
tion of constitutionality which attaches to every Act of Congress” tips the scales in favor of 
a stay); see also Walters v. Nat’l Assoc. of Radiation Survivors, 468 U.S. 1323, 1324 (1984) 
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 429 U.S. 1347,1348 (1977) 
(Rehnquist, Circuit Justice). 
 54 See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 506–507 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 
(summarizing the modern limits on the presumption, suggesting that it does not apply 
when “the very legitimacy of the composition of representative institutions is at stake,” to 
“legislation endangering fundamental constitutional rights, such as freedom of speech, or 
denying persons governmental rights or benefits because of race” or to legislation “direct-
ly impinging on the basic tripartite structure of our Government”); see also, e.g., Carolene 
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (suggesting that “[t]here may be narrower scope for opera-
tion of the presumption of constitutionality” when legislation appears to conflict with 
enumerated rights, restricts political processes, or is rooted in “prejudice against discrete 
and insular minorities”).  Sometimes, the Court suggests instead that the presumption is 
merely weakened in these contexts.  See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545 (1961) (“Where, 
as here, we are dealing with what must be considered ‘a basic liberty,’ [t]here are limits to 
the extent to which the presumption of constitutionality can be pressed . . . .” (internal ci-
tation omitted)). 
 55 The Court has, at times, flatly stated—as a truism—that the presumption is reversed in 
cases involving “fundamental rights.” See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76 
(1980) (“It is of course true that a law that impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly 
or implicitly secured by the Constitution is presumptively unconstitutional.”).  There are 
definitely contexts, such as speech restrictions, where the Court actively applies a pre-
sumption of unconstitutionality rather than of constitutionality.  See, e.g., Ashcroft v. 
ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004) (“[T]he Constitution demands that content-based re-
strictions on speech be presumed invalid and that the Government bear the burden of 
showing their constitutionality . . . .”  (internal citation omitted)); United States v. Playboy 
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cation of the modern presumption is limited to a smaller “core”—
such as when the Court considers whether a piece of federal social or 
economic legislation has exceeded Congress’s enumerated powers 
under the Constitution or violates equal protection in a challenge 
subject only to rational-basis review.56  This Article focuses on cases 
within this “core” where the modern presumption applies unques-
tionably and without qualification. 
When the presumption does clearly and fully apply, it is not in-
surmountable.57  However, the presumption does increase the chanc-
es that the statute will be upheld, and at least sometimes, for some 
Justices, the presumption of constitutionality is itself the determina-
tive factor behind a vote to uphold a statute.58 
Among scholars, while the countermajoritarian difficulty has re-
ceived constant, ample attention, the presumption of constitutionali-
ty is somewhat less theorized.59  However, several commentators have 
written both descriptively and normatively about the presumption—
describing what the Court has been doing and arguing about how 
strong the presumption should be and how to rationalize its applica-
tion.60 
As to both descriptive and normative academic efforts, the semi-
nal article is James Bradley Thayer’s 1893 paper, The Origins and Scope 
of the Doctrine of American Constitutional Law.61  In his article, Thayer 
collected and synthesized cases on the presumption of constitutional-
ity from the Court’s first century.62  He also articulated a vision of how 
the presumption of constitutionality should operate.  In Thayer’s 
 
Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000) (“When the Government restricts speech, the 
Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions.”). 
 56 See, e.g., Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 753–54 (1982) (“It 
is established beyond peradventure that ‘legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and bene-
fits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality . . . .’” 
(quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323 (1981))); United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 607–15 (2000) (applying a presumption of constitutionality when examining 
the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause in the context of the Vio-
lence Against Women Act of 1994). 
 57 E.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607. 
 58 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 110 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring) (“What tips the scale for 
me is the presumption of constitutionality normally accorded a State’s law.”). 
 59 See, e.g., David M. Burke, The “Presumption of Constitutionality” Doctrine and the Rehnquist 
Court:  A Lethal Combination for Individual Liberty, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 76 (1994) 
(“Perhaps because on its face the doctrine appears so unassuming, the ‘presumption of 
constitutionality’ doctrine has not engendered anything like the wrath that has befallen 
other Supreme Court dogma.”). 
60  See infra notes 61–70 and accompanying text.  
61  Thayer, supra note 1. 
62  Id. at 155 (“I am not stating a new doctrine, but attempting to restate more exactly and 
truly an admitted one.”). 
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view, the presumption was (and should be) a very strong one, under 
which the Court should not invalidate a statute unless its unconstitu-
tionality was “so clear that it is not open to rational question” or “un-
constitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.”63  Under this approach, 
the presumption would operate as a “thumb on the scale” and might 
lead a judge to uphold a statute even if he had a fairly strong belief 
that it might be unconstitutional.64 
Larry Kramer has argued that Thayer’s theory was itself an evolu-
tion of the earlier model of popular constitutionalism, under which 
the primary duty and authority to interpret the Constitution was re-
posed in the people themselves.65  In his view, Thayer’s theory substi-
tuted for the earlier vision of the primacy of the people in constitu-
tional interpretation, a related vision of the primacy of the people’s 
representatives.66  But, like that older vision, its “main concern . . . was 
to reassert that primary authority to interpret the Constitution is out-
side the courts and that judicial authority to declare statutes unconsti-
tutional is, at most, a subordinate, secondary check.”67 
Today, few scholars, and no Justices, favor an explicitly Thayerian 
approach.68  Instead, as the Court’s application of the presumption 
seems to have gotten weaker, many academic theorists have moved 
from recognizing and advocating a very robust presumption of con-
stitutionality to advocating a much weaker presumption, or advocat-
ing dispensing with the presumption entirely.  Randy Barnett, for ex-
 
 63 Thayer, supra note 1, at 144, 151. 
 64 Posner, supra note 23, at 537 (“Thayer wanted judges to place a thumb on the scale, so 
that . . . the statute would have to be upheld unless no reasonable person could doubt its 
invalidity.”); Thayer, supra note 1, at 144 (stating that the Court cannot invalidate a stat-
ute “merely because it is concluded that upon a just and true construction the law is un-
constitutional”). 
 65 See Larry D. Kramer, Judicial Supremacy and the End of Judicial Restraint, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 
621, 621 (2012) (“Thayer was not making a new argument.  He was, rather, reasserting an 
older, Jeffersonian notion that primary authority to interpret the Constitution lies with 
the people and not with courts.”); see also PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY:  SELF-
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 86–87 (1992) (“Thayer perceives 
judicial review as weakening the responsible exercise of popular sovereignty.”). 
 66 Kramer, supra note 65, at 628. 
 67 Kramer, supra note 65, at 628 (emphasis omitted). 
 68 See Posner, supra note 23, at 533 (“There are few academic Thayerians anymore and no 
apostles of restraint on the current Supreme Court.” (footnote omitted)); see also Posner, 
supra note 23, at 534 (noting that “there are no orthodox Thayerians” currently on the 
federal bench, but identifying two court of appeals judges who come close).  One scholar 
who has recently seemed to endorse Thayerian deference (or something similar) is Adri-
an Vermeule, who has argued for very substantial judicial deference to congressional con-
stitutional lawmaking.  See ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON (2009); see 
also Posner, supra note 23, at 533 n.55 (describing Vermeule, along with Mark Tushnet 
and Robin West, as three of the “few” extant academic Thayerians). 
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ample, argues that the presumption of constitutionality is unconstitu-
tional and should be replaced by a contrary “presumption of liberty” 
under which federal statutes are presumptively invalid.69  Barnett is 
not alone in arguing that the presumption of constitutionality is sus-
pect and should be scrapped altogether.70  The Court, however, has 
not shown any inclination to take up these suggestions by explicitly 
abolishing or reversing the presumption of constitutionality, even if it 
has been accused of effectively doing so in practice.71  More narrowly, 
other scholars have argued that the presumption should be revisited 
or reduced in specific substantive contexts.72 
Andrew Hessick has argued that the presumption of constitution-
ality, as currently applied, is misguided because it functions mainly as 
a doctrine of factual deference towards congressional statutes and 
does not result in judicial deference to legislative interpretations of 
the Constitution.73  In Hessick’s view, the rationales supporting the 
presumption of constitutionality better justify a presumption of con-
stitutionality that results in the current deference to congressional in-
terpretations of the Constitution than one that results in factual def-
erence to federal statutes.74 
Descriptively, several notable scholars and judges think that the 
current Court is reaching new depths (or heights) of non-deference 
to Congress.  Judge Richard Posner has argued that Thayerianism is 
essentially a dead-letter on the current Court, attributing this to the 
rise of constitutional theory and the sense of certainty it promotes.75  
In Posner’s view, Thayerian deference failed because it was replaced 
by the rise of constitutional theory and increased confidence in the 
 
 69 RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 
60 (2004). 
 70 See, e.g., Burke, supra note 59, at 76 (“[T]he doctrine is contrary to the principles underly-
ing the theory of constitutional government and poses a formidable obstacle to the safe-
guarding of individual liberty.”).  Thayer, in contrast, argued that the presumption was 
liberty-promoting because searching judicial review would actually weaken popular com-
mitment to liberty and engagement with the Constitution.  Thayer, supra note 1, at 155–
56 (“Under no system can the power of courts go far to save a people from ruin; our chief 
protection lies elsewhere.”). 
 71 See Karlan, supra note 13, at 13. 
 72 See, e.g., Margaret H. Lemos, The Commerce Power and Criminal Punishment:  Presumption of 
Constitutionality or Presumption of Innocence?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2006) (arguing 
against the application of the presumption to Commerce Clause-based criminal legisla-
tion). 
 73 See generally Hessick, supra note 35 (classing the presumption of constitutionality together 
with other restraining doctrines such as constitutional avoidance). 
 74 See generally Hessick, supra note 35; see also infra Part III.B (agreeing with Hessick’s argu-
ments about extending interpretive deference). 
 75 Posner, supra note 23, at 535–36. 
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ability of theory to answer questions of constitutional interpretation.76  
Pamela Karlan has argued that the Roberts Court, especially in its 
most recent term, displays active hostility to Congress and democratic 
processes in general, amounting to a default suspicion of unconstitu-
tionality.77  Others have argued, however, that the Court’s most recent 
Term—and, in particular, Chief Justice John Roberts’ vote in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius—are actually examples of 
the exercise of an increased, nearly Thayerian level of deference.78 
This Article’s arguments are situated in the context of the modern 
Court’s narrowing and weakening of the presumption and in the lit-
erature observing and commenting on that trend.  The argument is 
not concerned with whether the presumption should exist at all or 
when the presumption should apply, but instead with how it should 
apply in the core areas, where it clearly and unqualifiedly applies un-
der current doctrine.  The basic argument is that when the Court ap-
plies a presumption of constitutionality in favor of a federal statute, it 
should explicitly apply a stronger presumption in favor of the statute 
when the margin of passage is larger, increasing to a maximum level 
of extremely robust, Thayerian, beyond-rational-doubt deference. 
II.  ARGUMENTS FOR ADJUSTING THE PRESUMPTION OF 
CONSTITUTIONALITY BASED ON MARGIN OF STATUTORY PASSAGE 
Against the background of debates over the countermajoritarian 
difficulty and the evolutions in the doctrine of the presumption of 
constitutionality, this Part argues for adjusting the strength of the 
presumption of constitutionality based on the margin of statutory 
passage. 
A.  Furthering Democratic Values and Popular Constitutionalism 
The first and most compelling justification for adjusting the pre-
sumption of constitutionality to strengthen with the margin of statu-
 
 76 Posner, supra note 23, at 546 (“If they knew a statute was unconstitutional they’d have to 
strike it down even in Thayer’s account; and the modern theorists have proved (though 
only to their own satisfaction) that they can tell judges which outcomes in constitutional 
cases are correct and which incorrect.”).  Kramer, in contrast, attributes the decline of 
Thayerism to the rise of judicial supremacy in the 1960s and the decline of the older, Jef-
fersonian model of popular constitutionalism that inspired Thayer’s vision of the pre-
sumption of constitutionality.  See Kramer, supra note 65, at 621. 
 77 Karlan, supra note 13, at 29 ( “[T]he Roberts Court has lost faith in the democratic pro-
cess.”). 
 78 See O’Neill, supra note 47, at 171 (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts’ decision in the Af-
fordable Care Act case was an example of Thayerian deference). 
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tory passage is that it furthers democratic values in a way that is re-
sponsive to the countermajoritarian difficulty.  This argument rests 
on the basic premise that if it is troublingly undemocratic for a feder-
al court to strike down a duly enacted federal statute, this is more 
troublingly undemocratic to do so the larger the margin by which the 
statute passed.  That is, the larger the margin of passage, the larger 
the proportion of the people (as represented in Congress) whose will 
is thwarted by invalidating the statute.  For statutes passed by a nar-
row margin, in contrast, the antidemocratic concern is less. 
Inherent in the democratic principles underlying the Constitution 
is not just the idea that a bare majority should be respected because it 
represents the will of the people, but also the idea that larger majori-
ties more strongly represent the will of the people, and are entitled to 
more sway.79  Since the essence of the countermajoritarian concern is 
that it is problematically undemocratic for unelected judges to over-
turn a law supported by a majority of the public, the problem be-
comes greater for laws passed by a larger percentage of representa-
tives because more of the public is being thwarted.80  Thus, as the 
margin of passage gets larger, the argument gets stronger for defer-
ring to the people’s view that legislation is necessary (and constitu-
tional).81 
Since the antidemocratic concern becomes greater for statutes 
passed by larger margins, the Court should adjust its presumption of 
constitutionality to apply it more strongly as the margin gets larger.  
Conversely, when a statute passes by a narrow margin, there is re-
duced concern about thwarting the legislative expression of the pop-
ular will because the popular will is more equivocal.  The presump-
tion of constitutionality should be weaker. 
 
 79 This theoretical and philosophical principle is reflected in the Constitution’s provisions 
providing special powers to congressional supermajorities.  See infra Part II.B; Brett W. 
King, The Use of Supermajority Provisions in the Constitution:  The Framers, The Federalist Papers 
and the Reinforcement of a Fundamental Principle, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 363, 369 (1998) 
( “[T]he Constitution’s supermajority requirements should more accurately be viewed as 
mechanisms which reinforce notions of popular sovereignty . . . .”). 
 80 This is more obviously and directly true with respect to the House, since the Senate is it-
self a countermajoritarian institution because its federal structure leads to disproportion-
ate representation.  See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 16, at 49–62.  But even in the Senate, a 
smaller majority is less likely to represent the popular will.  Indeed, a narrow Senate ma-
jority often represents less than even a bare majority of the population.  See Benjamin Ei-
delson, Note, The Majoritarian Filibuster, 122 YALE L.J. 980, 1007 (2013) (noting that in 
thirty-four percent of the filibusters between 1991 and 2010, the majority supporting clo-
ture actually represented less than half of the national population). 
 81 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 65, at 634 (criticizing judicial supremacy and arguing for re-
viving popular constitutionalism). 
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This is consistent with one of the Court’s own primary rationales 
for applying the presumption of constitutionality—respect for demo-
cratic lawmaking.82  Since the presumption of constitutionality is 
rooted (at least in part) in deference to legislative expressions of ma-
jority will, the deference should be greater when the majority is larg-
er. 
Even for those who defend the legitimacy of judicial review on the 
basis of imperfections in our representative system,83 this argument 
should still have some force.  Although there are problems in our 
federal system’s mechanism for translating popular will into legisla-
tive action, these issues become less salient the larger the legislative 
majority—a statute that passes overwhelmingly is more likely to re-
flect the popular/democratic will.84  And, for statutes passed by nar-
rower margins, these concerns are more trenchant—there is a greater 
chance that a statute narrowly passed will fail to reflect the popular 
will, either because of structural defects in our system of representa-
tion85 or sometimes because of shenanigans86 undertaken to narrowly 
effect the passage of a particular bill.87  Thus, strengthening the pre-
sumption of constitutionality based on the margin of passage actually 
 
 82 See supra notes 37–38; Hessick, supra note 35, at 1462–67 (describing and summarizing 
cases advancing this rationale for the presumption). 
 83 See supra notes 15–17. 
 84 Cf. Waldron, supra note 9, at 1391 (“The system of legislative elections is not perfect ei-
ther, but it is evidently superior as a matter of democracy and democratic values to the 
indirect and limited basis of democratic legitimacy for the judiciary.”). 
 85 See, e.g., Terri Peretti, An Empirical Analysis of Alexander Bickel’s The Least Dangerous Branch, 
in THE JUDICIARY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY:  ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE 
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY, AND CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 127 
(Kenneth D. Ward & Cecilia R. Castillo eds., 2006) (arguing that legislation reflects ma-
jority public opinion only “roughly 55 to 65 percent of the time”). 
 86 Such as logrolling, arm-twisting, or enticement through earmarks.  See, e.g., Richard L. 
Hasen, Vote Buying, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1339–48 (2000) (examining desirability of leg-
islative logrolling from perspectives of “equality, efficiency, and inalienability”); Rebecca 
M. Kysar, Listening to Congress:  Earmark Rules and Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 519, 523–24 (2009) (arguing for a rule of statutory construction that would reject 
statutory interpretations proposed by “special interests” when those interpretations would 
confer benefits not disclosed by Congress’s own earmark-disclosure rules). 
 87 For example, if one is concerned about special interests’ power to persuade members of 
Congress to vote contrary to their constituents’ preference (and thinks that the courts 
should correct such deformations), this concern would diminish for statutes passed by 
larger margins because it is harder for special-interest lobbies to subvert legislative su-
permajorities (or near-supermajorities) than bare majorities.  See John O. McGinnis & 
Michael Rappaport, Supermajority Rules as a Constitutional Solution, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
365, 458–59 (1999) (arguing that when special interests generally favor additional spend-
ing, a supermajority rule may more closely reflect majority sentiment on spending than 
majority rule). 
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accommodates arguments that judicial review is justified based on 
flaws in our democratic processes. 
A larger margin of passage not only reflects a larger democratic 
majority inherently entitled to more deference, but also reflects a 
stronger assertion by Congress (and by representation, the people 
themselves) that the statute is constitutional.  Another of the Court’s 
primary justifications for applying a presumption of constitutionality 
(besides respect for democratic majorities) is that the premise that 
Congress considers the Constitution when it legislates and that the 
Court should give some deference to Congress’s belief that the stat-
ute it has passed is constitutional.88  Beyond the Court’s assertion, 
there is also some evidence to support this premise that Congress 
does consider the constitutionality of the statutes it passes, although 
the point is contested.89  Indeed, as of the 112th Congress, the House 
 
 88 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 738 (2008) (“The usual presumption is that 
Members of Congress, in accord with their oath of office, considered the constitutional 
issue and determined the amended statute to be a lawful one . . . .”); City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535 (1997) (“When Congress acts within its sphere of power and re-
sponsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own informed judgment on 
the meaning and force of the Constitution . . . .  Were it otherwise, we would not afford 
Congress the presumption of validity its enactments now enjoy.”); Hessick, supra note 35, 
at 1462–68 (discussing this “due respect” rationale); Hanah Metchis Volokh, Constitutional 
Authority Statements in Congress, 65 FLA. L. REV. 173, 182 (2013) (noting that under current 
doctrine, “[t]he act of passing the statute, alone, is seen as a congressional statement that 
the statute is constitutional in Congress’s opinion”). 
 89 See, e.g., Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial 
Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 62–65 (1986) (examining Congress’s duty to consider constitu-
tionality when legislating); Lee Epstein, Who Shall Interpret the Constitution?, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 1307, 1310 (2006) (reviewing NEAL DEVINS & KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, EDS., 
CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2005)) (arguing that, based on some of the work col-
lected in the reviewed book, “Congress may not be as wanting as some skeptics seem to 
think” when it comes to seriously engaging in constitutional interpretation); Louis Fisher, 
Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707 (1985) (analyzing 
Congress’s duty to interpret the Constitution and its performance of that duty using three 
specific examples); Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the 
Courts:  A Preliminary Inquiry into Legislative Attitudes, 1959–2001, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
127, 150 (2004) (concluding, based on two surveys of Congress members taken in 1956 
and 1999–2000, that at both times, “a plurality of . . . respondents favor independent 
congressional analysis of constitutional questions while also asserting that Congress exam-
ines constitutional questions in a bona fide way”); Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference 
and Interpretive Coordinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 656, 
657–58 (2000) (describing scholarship on non-judicial branches’ power and duty to in-
terpret the Constitution); Volokh, supra note 88, at 186–212 (discussing the role of con-
stitutional authority statements in the work of congressional constitutional interpreta-
tion); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Democratic Constitutionalism and the Affordable Care Act, 72 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1367 (2011) (arguing that members of Congress did consider constitutionality 
when passing the ACA).  For arguments that Congress does not seriously consider consti-
tutionality, see, for example, Neal Devins, Why Congress Did Not Think About the Constitution 
When Enacting the Affordable Care Act, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 261 (2012) (arguing that Con-
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formally requires a “constitutional authority statement” for each bill, 
explaining which constitutional power supports it.90 
If Congress does consider the Constitution when it legislates (as 
the Court presumes and some evidence suggests), a larger margin of 
passage indicates that Congress has more confidently asserted a belief 
that the law is constitutional.  Since the judicial presumption of con-
stitutionality is based in part on the assumption that Congress will 
perform its duty and exercise its ability to consider constitutionality 
before enactment, federal courts should apply a stronger presump-
tion of constitutionality when Congress has more unequivocally en-
dorsed the statute’s constitutionality.91 
Exercising a stronger presumption in favor of larger legislative 
majorities is also consistent with the Constitution’s structures and 
principles.92  The Constitution expressly empowers supermajorities in 
several ways.  Two of the most notable are that a two-thirds vote of 
Congress allows proposing a constitutional amendment and overrid-
ing a presidential veto.93  The Constitution thus empowers superma-
jorities of the people’s representatives to initiate a change of the 
Constitution itself, and to override the prerogatives of other branch-
es.  The underlying principle is that larger majorities of the people 
(through their representatives) should have more power to make pol-
icy and change the meaning of the Constitution.94  By analogy, the 
size of the voting majority that approves a given statute can and 
should inform the Court’s assessment of whether a statute has been 
sufficiently proven to be unconstitutional, whether a statute contra-
dicts the meaning of a particular constitutional provision, and wheth-
 
gress did not seriously consider and debate the constitutionality of the Affordable Care 
Act before passing it); Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Considera-
tion of Constitutional Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 737 (2011) (arguing that party polariza-
tion is responsible for the decline in congressional consideration of the constitutionality 
of statutes and in the necessary constitutional fact-finding to support statutes). 
 90 H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (2011) (adopting rules for the 112th Congress, including the 
Constitutional Authority Statement requirement); Volokh, supra note 88, at 186–212. 
 91 For the objection that it is naïve to presume that members of Congress in fact do consider 
constitutionality when they vote, see infra Part IV.D. 
 92 Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 839 (1991) (“[W]e must ground all methodological commit-
ments in the Constitution before we can recognize them as legitimate.”). 
 93 Others include impeachment convictions (two-thirds Senate majority), treaty ratification 
(two-thirds Senate majority), U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and restoring to Civil War re-
bels the ability to hold United States public office (two-thirds of each house), U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV § 3. 
 94 See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, 80 TEX. 
L. REV. 703, 705 (2002) (“[T]he central principle underlying the Constitution is govern-
ance through supermajority rules.”). 
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er the Court should reconsider, overrule, or limit its own constitu-
tional-interpretation precedents in order to uphold the statute. 
The argument is not that larger legislative majorities actually can 
amend the Constitution without following the formal amendment 
process,95 but merely that when the Court considers difficult ques-
tions about whether a federal statute is unconstitutional, it can and 
should consult the margin of statutory passage in deciding that ques-
tion, in addition to its own doctrines and theories of constitutional 
interpretation.  And the Constitution’s own formal mechanisms for 
privileging supermajorities implicitly support this approach. 
B.  Qualitative Superiority of Supermajority Enactments—Better Laws and 
Better Assessments of Constitutionality 
Deferring more to larger majorities through a stronger presump-
tion of constitutionality is not only warranted by democratic princi-
ples, it is also warranted because a statute passed by a larger majority 
is actually more likely to be a superior law, and also to be constitu-
tional.  That is, while the first argument in favor of an adjustable pre-
sumption is simply that larger majorities have a stronger claim to def-
erence because they are larger, this argument focuses on the point 
that larger majorities are more likely to be right—either about the 
quality of the legislation itself or about its constitutionality. 
A substantial body of scholarship has argued that supermajority 
decisions are better than bare majority decisions.  Among the leading 
scholars making this argument are John McGinnis and Michael Rap-
paport, who have argued in a series of articles that supermajority 
rules, like the ones that governed the ratification and amendment of 
the Constitution, tend to produce superior results in terms of the 
quality of legislation, as well as answer difficult questions about con-
stitutional rights and structure.96  Since supermajority rules produce 
 
 95 The theory is thus more limited than arguments like those of Bruce Ackerman, who has 
argued that in important “constitutional moments” the people can act to fundamentally 
change the structure and meaning of the constitution.  See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS (1991); Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures:  Discovering the Consti-
tution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1052 (1984) (arguing that the New Deal “moment” resulted in 
the “legitimation of the activist welfare state”). 
 96 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution 
98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1702 (2010) (arguing that supermajority rule is “the voting rule most 
conducive to generating a good constitution”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rap-
paport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 383, 385 (2007) (arguing for 
originalism on the theory that the supermajority rules under which the clauses were orig-
inally enacted were likely to have resulted in the most desirable provisions.); McGinnis & 
Rappaport, supra note 94, at 805 (“The Constitution binds us because the double super-
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better results, the Court should be more careful before overturning 
laws passed by larger votes—the Court should presume more strongly 
that these laws are constitutional because they are more likely to be of 
higher quality, and to be correct in how they address or resolve diffi-
cult questions about the limits of constitutional rights and structure. 
Further, other leading scholars, such as Cass Sunstein and Adrian 
Vermeule, have argued that the Court should defer to majority legis-
lation because, as the product of “many minds,” legislatures have cer-
tain epistemic advantages over courts.97  While these arguments are 
not unqualified,98 and also not specifically focused on the size of the 
enacting majority, they can support this Article’s argument.  As the 
majority grows larger, it becomes more likely that the legislature’s 
judgment is epistemically sound and less likely that it is the product 
of “information pathologies” such as informational cascades or polar-
ization in deliberative processes.99  Therefore, the argument for judi-
cial deference is stronger. 
These same arguments about the advantages of supermajority de-
cisions can also be applied to the specific question of Congress’s own 
assessment of a statute’s constitutionality under prevailing doctrine.  
That is, because supermajority decisions are superior to bare-majority 
decisions, not only is it more likely that the legislation is better, it is 
also more likely that Congress is right about whether the statute is 
constitutional.  This secondary argument does presume that Congress 
actually considers the constitutionality of statutes before passing 
them.100  But, as noted above, the presumption-of-constitutionality 
doctrine is based, at least partially, on Court’s assumption that Con-
gress does consider the Constitution when it legislates.101  And, there 
is evidence that Congress does see itself as having an independent 
duty to consider the Constitution when it legislates.102  Since the doc 
 
 
majoritarian requirements of formation and amendment ensures that its provisions gen-
erally have higher quality than ordinary legislation.”); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 
87, at 401 (arguing that supermajority rules are better than bare majority rules for mak-
ing spending decisions). 
 97 CASS SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS (2009); Vermeule, supra note 68, at 82 
(“[C]urrent legislatures are the decisionmakers in the best position, insofar as epistemic 
considerations are concerned, to oversee common-law constitutionalism.”). 
 98 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 97, at 212. 
 99 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, in DEBATING DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY 80 (James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett eds., 2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative 
Trouble?  Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000). 
100 Note, however, that the main argument does not. 
101 See supra note 88. 
102 See supra note 89. 
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trine is based on the assumption that Congress considers the Consti-
tution when it legislates, it should also acknowledge that Congress’s 
assessment is more likely to be correct for statutes that pass by larger 
margins. 
C.  Improved Judicial Legitimacy 
Applying an adjustable presumption tied to margin of passage 
would also improve judicial legitimacy.  The Court has expressed 
concerns about exercising its power of judicial review in ways that 
preserve or promote the Court’s legitimacy.103  Further, popular ap-
proval of the Court—perhaps a proxy for public perception of the 
Court’s legitimacy—is currently at an all-time low.104  So, it is im-
portant to consider whether adjusting the presumption of constitu-
tionality might improve the Court’s legitimacy in the public’s eyes, in 
particular because the Court itself would be more likely to do so if the 
Justices believed that it would be legitimacy-enhancing rather than 
legitimacy-destroying.105 
Applying an adjustable presumption of constitutionality would 
improve and preserve judicial legitimacy in two ways.  The first is that 
the Court’s legitimacy would improve because it would be less likely 
to strike down very popular statutes.  Since judicial review is some-
what controversial and can be perceived as antidemocratic, courts 
striking down duly-enacted statutes can be, and often are, perceived 
as acting illegitimately.  And, just as the countermajoritarian problem 
increases with the margin of passage,106 so too does the perception of 
 
103 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867–68 (1992) (explaining 
the importance of adhering to prior decisions exercising the power for preserving the 
Court’s legitimacy); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012) 
(“It is not our job to protect the people from the consequences of their political choic-
es.”). 
104 Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44% in New Poll, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 8, 2012, at A1 (“Those findings are a fresh indication that the court’s stand-
ing with the public has slipped significantly in the past quarter-century . . . .”); Sam Baker, 
High Court’s Approval Rating Hits New Low Ahead of Health Ruling, THE HILL, (May 1, 2012, 
1:08 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/legal-challenges/224799-approval-of-
supreme-court-hits-new-low-as-politically-charged-cases-loom (“Public opinion of the Su-
preme Court is at an all-time low . . . .”); Meghashyam Mali, Poll:  Supreme Court’s approval 
rating drops below 50 percent for first time, THE HILL, (June 25, 2013, 8:51 AM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/313407-poll-supreme-courts-
approval-drops-below-50-percent (“The Supreme Court’s favorability rating has dropped 
below 50 percent for the first time . . . .”). 
105 For a response to the objection that adjusting the presumption of constitutionality based 
on margin of passage would actually undermine judicial legitimacy by making it seem that 
the Court caves to political pressure, see discussion infra Part IV.C. 
106 See supra Part I.A. 
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illegitimacy.  That is, a court striking down legislation endorsed by an 
overwhelming majority of the people’s representatives is more likely 
to be unpopular and viewed as acting illegitimately.107  Conversely, 
when the statute passed narrowly, the portion of the populace that 
will consider the Court illegitimate in striking it down is likely to be 
smaller.108  Adjusting the presumption of constitutionality based on 
the margin of passage would address this problem because it will 
make the Court less likely to strike down statutes passed by over-
whelming margins, and so produce fewer critical hits to the Court’s 
legitimacy. 
To this, a critic might respond that deferring more to more popu-
lar laws is exactly what the Court already does, precisely because of 
concerns about judicial overreach and loss of legitimacy.109  However, 
if so, it is better that the Court admit as much, which is the second 
way that incorporating the margin of passage into the presumption of 
constitutionality would improve judicial legitimacy—by alleviating 
perceptions of illegitimacy arising when the Court’s articulated rea-
sons do not contain the perceived real reason for its decision. 
On several occasions in the Court’s history, it has been perceived 
that the Court has declined to strike down statutes precisely because 
they were very popular or part of a legislative program that com-
manded substantial majority support.110  It has also been proposed 
that the Court hesitated in these instances specifically because of 
 
107 This does presume that actual popular will correlates with margin of statutory passage, 
but even critics of the representativeness of Congress do seem to conclude that there is 
some connection between the two.  See, e.g., Peretti, supra note 85, at 127. 
108 This is based on the assumption that on average, someone who supported a statute or 
policy is more likely to see invalidation as not only wrong, but illegitimate, while someone 
who opposed it is less likely to fret about the legitimacy of the Court’s decision to invali-
date a statute they disagree with on policy grounds. 
109 See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:  The Supreme Court as a National 
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. LAW 279, 286 (1957) (arguing that over time, “lawmaking majorities 
generally have had their way”); see also supra note 15 (collecting other examples of this ar-
gument). 
110 Perhaps the most famous example is the “switch in time that saved nine” of W. Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).  A more recent example is NAMUDNO v. Holder, 129 S. 
Ct. 2504 (2009).  See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by 
the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 218 (speculating that the Court’s avoidance rul-
ing in NAMUDNO may have been motivated by “fears that full-blown constitutional pro-
nouncement would harm its legitimacy”).  See generally John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasqui-
no, The Countermajoritarian Opportunity, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 353, 354 (2010) (noting the 
phenomenon of cases “in which the United States Supreme Court has appeared to back 
down in the face of political pressures or threats”).  If NAMUDNO was indeed motivated 
by fears about overturning a popular statute, however, the Court overcame those fears in 
fairly short order when it took the further step of striking down Section 4(b) of the Vot-
ing Rights Act in the most recent Term.  Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
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concerns about being perceived as illegitimate—invalidating policies 
preferred by large majorities.  Since the Court has limited political 
capital as the “least dangerous branch,”111 it must, for institutional 
reasons, be careful about striking down widely popular legislative (or 
executive) acts.112  Moreover, there has been a substantial literature, 
especially in political science, devoted to arguing that there is no 
countermajoritarian problem at all because the Court absorbs and 
accommodates itself to majoritarian political preferences.113 
Yet, decisions perceived as rooted in judicial consciousness of 
popularity (as reflected in vote margin) generally have not expressly 
acknowledged the popularity of the statutes as part of the reasoning 
supporting the decision.  This may create a different sort of percep-
tion of illegitimacy:  that the Court is acting illegitimately in the sense 
of being disingenuous, or motivated by institutional selfishness and 
self-preservation.114  If the Court were to apply an adjustable presump-
tion of constitutionality tied to margin of statutory passage, these per-
ceptions could be alleviated.  A Court which decided to uphold a 
statute against constitutional challenge (in part) because it was very 
popular could say so and rely on that fact as a legal reason for its de-
cision.115  If considering the amount of popular support for an en-
actment—and not just the fact of statutory passage—became a legiti-
mate legal reason, then the gap between realist and formalist 
explanations for the Court’s actions and motivations could be help-
fully lessened.116 
 
111 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
112 See, e.g., Hasen, supra note 110, at 218; Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, Or Felix the Cat, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 620, 631 (1994) (describing the prevailing assessment of the West Coast 
Hotel “switch in time” as motivated by the Court’s political fears). 
113 See supra notes 14, 109. 
114 See Liptak & Kopicki, supra note 104 (“Just one in eight Americans said the justices decid-
ed cases based only on legal analysis.”).  Similar criticisms were leveled heavily at Chief 
Justice Roberts by critics disappointed with his vote in the Sebelius case.  See, e.g., Gregory 
P. Magarian, The Lawlessness of Sebelius 26–27 (Aug. 9, 2012) (unpublished paper), availa-
ble at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1011&
context=gregory_magarian (speculating that Roberts’ Sebelius vote, if motivated by a de-
sire to preserve the Court’s institutional authority, failed in doing so). 
115 In addition, a Court that invalidated a statute passed by large margins would do so only 
after explicitly applying a very strong presumption in its favor based on its popularity, 
which in turn might reduce the perception that the Court was thwarting a large majority 
for merely political reasons. 
116 The counterargument—that it would be harmful for the Court to be seen to be openly 
bowing to “political pressure” in arriving at its decisions—is addressed in Part IV.C. 
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D.  Decreased Reliance on Subjective Extraconstitutional Theorizing, Policy 
Preferences, and Opportunistic Rhetoric of Restraint 
A further advantage of applying an adjustable presumption based 
on margin of statutory passage is its relative objectivity, which could 
produce a more direct fidelity to democratic principles and popular 
constitutionalism than some other theories seeking to palliate the 
countermajoritarian problem.  In attempting to address the problems 
created by the countermajoritarian difficulty, many theorists have de-
vised various frameworks or concepts designed to explain or lay a 
path for alternate forms of constitutional change driven by the legis-
latively-expressed popular will.  Examples include Bruce Ackerman’s 
theory of “constitutional moments”117 or Eskridge and Ferejohn’s 
theory of “super statutes,” under which certain statutes can be as-
sessed to be particularly important and thus particularly deserving of 
judicial deference based on factors besides the statutory text itself.118 
The disadvantage of these sorts of theories, though, is that they 
require necessarily subjective and extraconstitutional assessments of 
factors outside the statute itself.  Constitutional moments theory re-
quires assessing history and politics to judge whether a given period 
or legislative program is a constitutional moment or just “normal pol-
itics.”119  And the “super-statute” theory requires subjective determina-
tions about whether the statute embraces a lofty goal and whether it 
has been subsequently embraced by the public.120  These sorts of as-
sessments invite the theorist (or the jurist) to pick statutes based on 
policy preferences and then acclaim them as sufficiently “momen-
 
117 1 ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS, supra note 95 (distinguishing between peri-
ods of normal politics, and moments of constitutional politics—such as the Framing, Re-
construction, and the New Deal—when the People mobilize to resolve issues of great con-
stitutional and political import). 
118 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L. J. 1215 (2001) (argu-
ing that a statute is “super” when it (1) “seek[s] to establish a new normative or institu-
tional framework for state policy,” (2) “over time ‘stick[s]’ in the public culture, and (3) 
has “a broad effect on the law”).  These theories may not be aimed solely at the counter-
majoritarian difficulty, but both are arguments that certain sorts of statutes or legislative 
programs should receive more judicial deference because they are more authentically 
representative of popular will.  They are not the only theories in this vein—examples are 
legion—but they are particularly well-thought out, and influential, and so make good foils 
for the argument. 
119 See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures:  Discovering the Constitution, supra note 95, at 1055–56 
(“[C]onstitutional moments . . . allow[] Americans to place a constitutional meaning up-
on a sustained series of electoral victories and legislative successes that is very different 
from the meaning ordinarily attached to any single episode of normal politics.”). 
120 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 118, at 1217. 
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tous” or “super” based on a motivated reading of the relevant history 
and currents of popular opinion. 
Looking to the margin of passage, in contrast, removes filters of 
subjective assessments about the historical popularity, importance, or 
policy wisdom of an enactment and gives the Court an objective indi-
cation based purely on the actual degree of representative democrat-
ic endorsement.  It allows the Constitution to be treated as somewhat 
flexible, or “living,” but lets the organic evolution be driven by objec-
tive evidence of legislatively expressed popular will rather than the 
preferences of judges or theorists.121 
Similarly, the Court itself has proceeded through phases in terms 
of which constitutional rights or provisions it enforces more rigorous-
ly.  The Court went from rigorous enforcement of the Commerce 
Clause in the Hammer v. Dagenhart122 era to almost total nonenforce-
ment of that restriction for decades,123 with a resurgence under the 
Rehnquist Court in cases like United States v. Lopez124 and United States 
v. Morrison,125 followed by a retreat under the Roberts Court in cases 
like Gonzales v. Raich126 and a limited revival in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius.127  Federalism limitations were almost 
entirely unenforced through judicial invalidation of federal statutes 
before the Rehnquist Court began vigorously policing federalism lim-
its,128 only to cease expanding, and arguably retreat, under the late 
Rehnquist129 and early Roberts Court130. 
 
121 Contra, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 44–45 (1997) (“[T]he most glaring defect of Living Constitutionalism . . . is that 
there is no agreement, and no chance of agreement, upon what is to be the guiding prin-
ciple of the evolution.”); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. 
L. REV. 639, 695 (1976) (condemning the version of living constitutionalism that pre-
scribes that “nonelected members of the federal judiciary may address themselves to a so-
cial problem simply because other branches of government have failed or refused to do 
so”). 
122 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
123 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
124 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
125 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
126 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (holding that Congress had power, under the Commerce Clause, to 
outlaw home-grown marijuana). 
127 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587 (2012) (stating that the Affordable Care Act was beyond Congress’s 
Commerce Clause powers). 
128 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (invalidating provi-
sions of the Americans with Disabilities Act as exceeding Congress’s power to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Kimel v. Fla. 
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (invalidating provisions of Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act as exceeding Congress’s power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding 
that Congress may not abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity from suit in its own courts); 
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Through these sorts of evolutions, the Court’s decisions about 
which rights to privilege and which restrictions to enforce robustly 
have been driven by the Justices themselves.  It could be argued that 
these changes are democratic, because the Justices are nominated 
and confirmed by representative actors, because they are drawn from 
the people themselves and so share popular opinions about constitu-
tional evolution, or because they are aware of and respond to popular 
opinion.131  However, this sort of second-order representativeness is 
suspect, especially in the modern era, as Justices serve long past the 
departure of the representative officials who nominated and con-
firmed them and are ever more narrowly drawn from the ranks of 
former federal appellate judges with elite pedigrees.132  Further, there 
have been many instances in the Court’s history when shifts in the hi-
erarchy or importance of various constitutional rights and prohibi-
tions seem to have originated from the Court itself, not from demo-
cratic pressures.133 
 
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 628 (1999) 
(holding that patent legislation could not be upheld as valid congressional abrogation of 
state sovereign immunity pursuant to Congress’s powers under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that 
Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity through exercise of its Commerce 
Clause powers); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down as unconstitu-
tional provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that “commandeered” 
state law enforcement officers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding 
that the “take title” provision of the radioactive-waste statute violated the Tenth Amend-
ment).  
129 See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (upholding provisions of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act as validly abrogating state sovereign immunity through Congress’s 
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. 
Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 
1993 as valid abrogations of state sovereign immunity through Congress’s powers under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
130 See Christopher Banks & John Blakeman, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and New Federal-
ism Jurisprudence, 38 PUBLIUS:  J. OF FEDERALISM 576, 576 (2008) (concluding, based on a 
review of the Roberts Court’s federalism decisions, that it is uncertain whether the Court 
will as vigorously police federalism restrictions as the Rehnquist Court). 
131 See supra notes 14, 119. 
132 See Karlan, supra note 13, at 5 (arguing that the fact that none of the Court’s current 
members have any experience as elected officials may be responsible for their disdain for 
legislative enactments); Pildes, supra note 14, at 117. 
133 Examples of this, in my opinion, would include the Court’s vigorous enforcement of eco-
nomic restrictions during the Lochner era (prior to the West Coast Hotel climbdown), see, 
e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); the Warren Court’s criminal-procedure 
revolution, see, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); the Rehnquist Court’s fed-
eralist revival, see, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); and the Roberts 
Court’s revival of the Second Amendment as an enforceable limit on government firearm 
restrictions, see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
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Even for those who believe that judicial review is an essential 
check on the majority’s power to infringe others’ constitutional 
rights, it seems far less desirable that choices about which rights to 
privilege should also be made in a countermajoritarian, unrepre-
sentative fashion.  Applying an adjustable presumption of constitu-
tionality based on the margin of passage would let the people’s repre-
sentatives speak about which constitutional restrictions should be 
considered more or less important at a given time.  It gives more lati-
tude to statutes passed by a larger margin when reviewed for compli-
ance with the constitutional text as construed by the evolving doc-
trines of the Supreme Court.  Or, at a minimum, incorporating a 
presumption of constitutionality based on the margin of passage 
might inject some democratic responsiveness into these undemocrat-
ic evolutions. 
Further, adopting an adjustable presumption of constitutionality 
tied to the objective indicia of the margin of passage might also check 
the trend for the Justices to use judicial restraint mainly as a rhetori-
cal tool, while actually voting to invalidate statutes essentially on ideo-
logical lines.134  A statute passed by a larger margin would command 
more deference and one by a narrower margin less—so there would 
be some objective standard on which to peg the Court’s changing 
statements and applications of the principle that the Court should 
give federal statutes a presumption of constitutionality somewhere 
between beyond a rational doubt and the benefit of the doubt. 
E.  Practical Virtues of Easier Adoption 
Finally, the proposal for an adjustable presumption has the practi-
cal virtue that it could be implemented solely by the Court itself.  
Proposals for ameliorating the countermajoritarian difficulty by stat-
ute or constitutional amendment rarely seem to generate great sup-
port, with a few limited exceptions, and none has actually been en-
acted into law.135  It thus seems that, even if very innovative, these 
 
134 See Epstein & Martin, supra note 48, at 737 (arguing that the empirical evidence indicates 
that since 1969, Justices generally vote to uphold or invalidate statutes based on ideologi-
cal preferences); Kramer, supra note 65, at 634 (arguing that it is harmful that judicial 
deference has become essentially “a rhetorical tool used opportunistically by pretty much 
all of the Justices”). 
135 For a summary of the history of such efforts, including a description of several “waves” of 
enthusiasm for somehow restricting judicial review, see Caminker, supra note 8, at 115.  
On the obstacles raised by Article V to any such change actually happening, see, for ex-
ample, LEVINSON, supra note 16, at 159–166; Sanford Levinson, Op-Ed., Our Imbecilic Con-
stitution, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A23 (“But if one must choose the worst single part 
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sorts of external proposals have a small chance of ever being enact-
ed.136  It is much more likely that the Court itself would or could 
evolve its jurisprudence of constitutional adjudication to incorporate 
a concept of an adjustable presumption of constitutionality,137 just as 
it has already evolved or adjusted the presumption for other rea-
sons.138  Further, since many of the Court’s most controversial deci-
sions invalidating federal statutes are 5-4 decisions, it would only re-
quire one Justice to adopt the approach for it to potentially make a 
significant difference in outcomes.  Thus, the argument described 
above has the additional virtue of easier practical implementation. 
In summary, courts can and should adjust the presumption of 
constitutionality so that it is stronger for statutes passed by larger 
margins.  Doing so would promote democratic values and popular 
constitutionalism in a less subjective way than jurist- or theorist-driven 
constitutional evolution, cohere with the Constitution’s supermajori-
tarian principles and provisions, and improve the judicial legitimacy 
of the Supreme Court.  The next Part considers how such an adjusta-
ble presumption might work and when it might apply 
III.  APPLYING AN ADJUSTABLE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY 
If it makes sense to exercise a stronger presumption of constitu-
tionality in favor of statutes passed by larger margins in Congress, it 
becomes necessary to consider how and when the principle might be 
applied.  The “how” discussion focuses on describing maximums and 
minimums for an adjustable presumption of constitutionality, both in 
terms of the strength of the presumption and in terms of the size of 
the margin required to trigger them.  The “when” discussion explains 
that the adjustable presumption would apply only in the core of cases 
where the Court currently uncontestably applies the presumption 
and offers some thoughts about the types of cases in which applying 
an adjustable presumption might make a difference. 
 
of the Constitution, it is surely Article V, which has made our Constitution among the 
most difficult to amend of any in the world.”). 
136 See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 68 (arguing for changing the American system of lawmak-
ing so that Congress can pass “liquidating statutes” codifying certain interpretations of 
the Constitution). 
137 For a response to the objection that while it might be easier for such a proposal to be im-
plemented by the Court itself, it also makes it more improbable because the Court would 
never rein in its judicial supremacy, see infra Part IV.F. 
138 See supra Part I.B. 
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A.  How an Adjustable Presumption Could Work 
To see how the Supreme Court might apply an adjustable pre-
sumption of constitutionality to federal statutes, it is helpful to start 
by defining limits.  There are two questions to answer here:  (1) what 
are the strongest and weakest presumptions of constitutionality that 
should be applied, and (2) what are the maximum and minimum 
margins of passage to associate with those limits. 
At its weakest, the presumption should be no weaker than the pre-
sumption as applied by the modern Court.  While the doctrinal con-
tent of the presumption in its current form is not clear,139 it seems 
that the current Court at least sometimes applies the presumption of 
constitutionality as a mere tiebreaker, akin to a preponderance bur-
den of proof, so that when the evidence is in equipoise, the statute 
receives the benefit of the doubt.140  It also seems clear that the Court 
currently does not consider that the presumption calls for any partic-
ular deference to Congress’s interpretation of the Constitution (in con-
trast to evidentiary issues relating to whether a statute is constitution-
al).  This, then, would be the lower limit of the adjustable 
presumption—both since it is the weakest form of the presumption 
described in the Court’s cases and since it seems to be the weakest 
form of deference that still can qualify as a presumption.141 
On the other end, there is the maximum—the presumption at its 
strongest.  Probably the strongest articulation of the presumption is 
Thayer’s view (drawn from the Court’s earlier cases) that the Court 
should not overturn a statute unless it can be shown to be unconstitu-
tional beyond a reasonable doubt.142  This is what shall be the maxi-
mum strength of the adjustable presumption of constitutionality.  
Here, again, this seems to be the strongest formulation of the pre-
sumption that has been offered while still qualifying as a presumption 
rather than an absolute command to uphold the statute.143  Moreover, 
 
139 See supra Part I.B. 
140 See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 110 (2003) (Souter, J, concurring) (“What tips the 
scale for me is the presumption of constitutionality normally accorded a State’s law.”). 
141 It might be possible to imagine weaker formulations, but the mere-tiebreaker formulation 
has the twin virtues of being already present in the Court’s cases and of being fairly easy 
to understand and apply. 
142 Thayer, supra note 1, at 140. 
143 It might be possible to imagine even stronger descriptions of the presumption that would 
still qualify as merely a presumption, but the Thayerian presumption has the virtue of fa-
miliarity—it has been around as an academic and theoretical concept for over 100 years, 
it has even older roots in the Court’s own cases, and it has been engaged with by later 
scholars and theorists as a maximum of possible deference to Congress.  See, e.g., 
Caminker, supra note 8, at 115; Posner, supra note 23, at 521–23. 
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Thayer’s formulation itself was drawn from cases from the Court’s 
first century,144 so it has the additional virtue of being supported by 
precedent, which could be important for convincing the Court that it 
would be legitimate to adopt it.  Extreme Thayerian deference has 
fallen out of favor,145 but it could and should be revived, at least as a 
limit to which judicial deference should approach as the margin of 
statutory passage approaches the maximum—a Thayerian limit for 
the presumption of constitutionality. 
At this maximum strength, the presumption would operate as a 
“thumb on the scale” that could prompt the Court to uphold a statute 
even if it has significant doubts about its constitutionality.146  This 
would extend to requiring a very high level of evidentiary proof to 
demonstrate that a particular statute fails to pass the tests for consti-
tutionality prescribed by the Court’s doctrines and a very low bar for 
evaluating the sufficiency of supportive congressional fact-findings in 
areas where the Court’s doctrines have evolved to require them.  Fur-
ther, at this maximal level, the presumption would extend not only to 
factual deference, but also to questions of interpretation.147  That is, 
for a statute passed by a sufficiently large majority, the Court would 
also defer to Congress’s interpretation of the Constitution (as reflect-
ed in the statute) and potentially reconsider or disregard the Court’s 
own interpretations of constitutional texts arising out of the Court’s 
own doctrines or theories.148 
So, the presumption would adjust in strength from a minimum of 
mere-tiebreaker factual deference, with no interpretive deference, to 
a maximum presumption requiring proof of invalidity beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, including a strong degree of interpretive deference to 
Congress. 
Tying these limits to points on the spectrum of margin of statutory 
passage, the minimum would be a statute passed by a razor-thin,  one-
 
144 See, e.g., Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878) (each applying a reasonable-doubt for-
mulation of the presumption); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). 
145 See supra Part I.B. 
146 See Posner, supra note 23, at 537 (describing the Thayerian presumption in these terms). 
147 See Hessick, supra note 35, at 1450–67 (advancing arguments that, in general, the justifica-
tions for the presumption of constitutionality more strongly support interpretive defer-
ence than factual/evidentiary deference); see also infra Part III.B (examining reasons for 
extending interpretive deference). 
148 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 23, at 537 (explaining how a Thayerian presumption could 
lead an originalist Justice to uphold a statute even if contrary to the “best” originalist in-
terpretation of the Constitution); Thayer, supra note 1, at 150 (“[T]he ultimate question 
is not what is the true meaning of the constitution, but whether legislation is sustainable 
or not.”). 
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vote margin in both houses.149  Thus, the presumption would be 
weakest, and deference limited to a mere tiebreaker at equipoise, for 
statutes that barely squeak through. 
As to the maximum—the limit at or beyond which the strongest 
version of the presumption would apply—there are at least two natu-
ral possibilities.  One would be the unanimous statute.  Unanimous 
passage is as much representative or democratic endorsement as a 
statute can get and so would be an easy definition for the limit at 
which the strongest, Thayerian presumption of constitutionality 
would apply. 
The better approach, however, would be to set the maximum at 
supermajority passage (in both Houses).150  There are good structural 
arguments for this approach:  a Congressional supermajority is 
enough to propose a constitutional amendment151 and to override a 
Presidential veto.152  Larger vote margins in Congress have no formal 
effect under the Constitution—that is, there is nothing that a unani-
mous Congress can do that a supermajority Congress cannot.  There-
fore, it should be enough to trigger the strongest possible presump-
tion of constitutionality when a supermajority of both Houses votes to 
pass a statute.153 
Statutes actually passed by unanimous or near-unanimous votes 
are more rare, so if the strongest presumption were limited to those 
statutes, it would have less practical effect.  The proposal to adjust the 
presumption of constitutionality is intended to actually increase the 
deference given to very popular statutes (for the reasons discussed 
above in Part II), and having the maximum presumption kick in at 
supermajority approval would further this goal. 
 
149 Theoretically, the narrowest possible margin of passage would be a statute passed by one 
vote in the House, and by a tiebreaking Vice-Presidential vote in the Senate.  Since the 
proposal is for an adjustable presumption, however, the potential difference between a 
51-49 Senate vote and a 51-50 Senate vote is not critical.  As for the possible problems 
arising from discrepancies in the vote margin between the two houses, and some 
thoughts about solutions to these problems, this is discussed further infra Part IV.E. 
150 By supermajority, I mean a two-thirds supermajority of voting members, as referred to in 
the Constitution.  For a discussion of different ways to count  the “denominator” for ma-
jority votes and possible consequences of different approaches, see Adrian Vermeule, Ab-
solute Voting Rules (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 103, 2005), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=791724. 
151 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
152 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. 
153 See supra Part II.B (justifying the adjustable-presumption argument by reference to the 
Constitution’s supermajoritarian provisions and scholarship arguing for the superiority of 
supermajoritarian requirements). 
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Between the extremes, the scale—the amount of deference—
would slide.  This Article does not define exactly the scale or the lev-
els of deference applying at different points.  The idea of an adjusta-
ble presumption is simply to nuance the application of the presump-
tion of constitutionality in a way that is sensitive and responsive to 
concerns about the antidemocratic, countermajoritarian difficulty 
caused by judicial review using the objective indicator of the margin 
of statutory passage.  The workings of the sliding scale in intermedi-
ate cases could be worked out case by case. 
With that said, one natural midpoint between the two extremes of 
minimal, tiebreaker deference and maximal, Thayerian deference 
would be some sort of “clear showing” deference.  This might come 
into play when a statute was passed by a relatively large margin even if 
not a unanimous or supermajority vote.  And here, again, there is 
precedent for this formulation of the presumption of constitutionali-
ty in the Court’s cases.154 
B.  When the Adjustable Presumption Would Apply and Potentially Make a 
Difference 
This Article argues only for the application of an adjustable pre-
sumption of constitutionality in the core cases where it is clear that a 
presumption of constitutionality applies with full force under current 
doctrine, without being weakened, lessened, or inverted.155  Examples 
within this core would include social or economic legislation which is 
challenged on equal protection grounds or as being beyond Con-
gress’s enumerated powers under the Constitution.156  But the adjust-
able presumption, as described in this Article, would not apply in ar-
eas such as challenges based on fundamental rights, enumerated 
rights, or discrimination against discrete minorities, since the Court 
has said that the presumption does not apply with full force (or per-
haps at all) in such areas.157 
However, for present purposes, this Article does argue for (and 
endorse others’ arguments for) expanding the scope of the presump-
tion beyond current doctrine in one significant way—the presump-
tion should extend not only to fact questions, but also to questions of 
constitutional interpretation.  In particular, Andrew Hessick’s argu-
 
154 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 332 (1981). 
155 See discussion supra Part II.B (discussing areas outside this core, where the Court does not 
apply the presumption). 
156 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
157 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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ment is correct that the application of the presumption of constitu-
tionality should be extended (or, really, returned) to apply not only 
to factual determinations about the evidence required to invalidate a 
statute, but also to questions of constitutional interpretation that 
arise in the course of adjudicating constitutional challenges.158  In ad-
dition, below are thoughts on when and how the strong, Thayerian 
form of the presumption might prompt the Court to reconsider doc-
trine or let theory yield to the expression of popular endorsement. 
The presumption has the most limited impact when a statute is 
challenged as violating a specific, express constitutional restriction.  
For example, if Congress unanimously passed a statute immediately 
raising its compensation, even the very strong presumption of consti-
tutionality would not save the statute because the constitutional re-
striction159 is so clear, and the operative legal test is not based on 
judge-made doctrines and glosses grafted onto the text.  There could 
be no “rational doubt”160 that the law violates the constitutional re-
striction.  Therefore, even the very strong presumption would be 
overcome. 
Instead, the adjustable presumption would have more effect in ar-
eas where constitutional powers and guarantees are more open-
ended and indeterminate, and the actually decisive rules in any given 
case will be doctrines and tests formulated by the Court as glosses or 
interpretations on the Constitution.  Examples would include such 
issues as determining whether legislation is “necessary and proper” to 
execute Congress’s enumerated powers,161 whether legislation is with-
in Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause,162 whether legisla-
tion passed pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
within Congress’s powers to pierce state sovereign immunity,163 or 
whether congressional legislation violates the Establishment Clause.164  
 
158 See Hessick, supra note 35, at 1460 (noting the difference between the current “presump-
tion of constitutionality” and Thayerian, interpretive deference); Hessick, supra note 35, 
at 1461–94 (arguing that the reasons for the presumption support interpretive deference 
more than factual or evidentiary deference). 
159 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII.  
160 Thayer, supra note 1, at 142 n.1.  
161 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
2566, 2586–91 (2012). 
162 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see, e.g., Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2591–93; United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). 
163 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997). 
164 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) 
(considering but not deciding the question whether the Congressional Pledge of Alle-
giance Act violates the Establishment Clause).  This Article takes questions under the Es-
tablishment Clause to be questions about Congress’s powers rather than questions about 
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Put more generally, there would be a wide scope for application of 
the adjustable presumption, including in some of the most hotly con-
tested areas of statutory and constitutional interaction in recent 
years.165  So, the adjustable presumption would apply in many cases 
that matter. 
In these more open-ended areas, applying an adjustable presump-
tion of constitutionality would offer an alternative to placing singular 
faith in specific theories of interpretation.  Rather than making very 
close calls based strictly on the contested application of an interpre-
tive theory, Justices instead could look outside the theory to give 
weight to the degree of popular endorsement conveyed by the mar-
gin of statutory passage.166 
Another major way the adjustable presumption would apply would 
be in affecting the Court’s application of stare decisis and its willing-
ness to revisit its prior decisions and doctrinal tests.  The Court’s ap-
plication of stare decisis is inconsistent—it has no firm rules about 
when to follow its own precedents (and, if it did, it would not be 
bound to respect them).167  The Justices sometimes accuse each other 
of “faux judicial restraint” that consists of pretending to adhere to 
precedents while essentially rewriting them.168  Scholars similarly trace 
how the Court can gut prior decisions and lines of precedent under 
the guise of purporting to respect them.169  Thus, the Court has room 
to be flexible in applying its prior cases. 
So, when a statute passes by a wide margin, but seems to run afoul 
of the Court’s prior cases, the Court should be most willing to revisit 
its own precedents.  The main reasons, as indicated above, are that 
 
infringement on the fundamental rights of citizens and therefore properly within the 
“core” the adjustable presumption of constitutionality described by this Article would ap-
ply.  This, however, is an unconventional position. 
165 For example, the Commerce Clause and Taxing Power as construed in Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 
at 2566, or the Voting Rights Act renewal that was struck down by the Court in Shelby 
County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
166 See infra Part IV.A (discussing room for an adjustable presumption alongside theories 
such as originalism). 
167 See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Morse, School Speech, and Originalism, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
637, 648 (2009) (“In some respects, all of the Justices can be accused of inconsistency in 
their invocation of stare decisis.”). 
168 See Berguis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2272 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (claim-
ing that the majority “overrules sub silentio an essential aspect” of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966)); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 498 n.7 
(2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“This faux judicial 
restraint is judicial obfuscation.”). 
169 Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 108 (1991) (noting ways in which “the Court can destroy a prece-
dent without overruling it”). 
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the countermajoritarian concern is at its strongest when a statute has 
passed by a large margin and that a wide margin of passage indicates 
both a strong majority will in favor of the legislation and a vocal asser-
tion from the coordinate branch that the legislation is constitution-
al.170 
This should especially be the case where the Court’s doctrines 
have developed elaborately out of relatively simple and open-ended 
constitutional texts.  One example would be the Court’s jurispru-
dence under the Establishment Clause.  This area is notoriously diffi-
cult, vexed, and productive of serial judicial tests designed to imple-
ment the constitutional rule.171  These tests are generally not derived 
from the constitutional text itself.  This does not make them inher-
ently wrong or illegitimate—they represent the Court’s efforts to 
translate the Constitution’s broad guarantees into rules of specific 
application in individual cases.  But, it is in areas like this, where the 
argument is strongest, that acts of Congress passed by overwhelming 
majorities should prompt the Court to review and revisit its own doc-
trines, operating as a wake-up call to the Court to reexamine the doc-
trinal tests it has crafted in an attempt to translate constitutional text 
into rules of decision.172 
IV.  OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES 
This Part now considers some of the many objections that might 
be leveled at the proposal to adjust the presumption of constitution-
ality based on the margin of statutory passage and attempts to show 
 
170 For the contrary argument—that the Court should be most adamant about sticking to 
decisions that are the most unpopular—and a response, see infra Part IV.C. 
171 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (holding that the display of the Ten 
Commandments on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (finding that the Establishment 
Clause prohibited public school students from being exposed to “nonsectarian” prayer 
given by school-selected clergymen at a graduation ceremony); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602 (1971) (holding two statutes providing state aid to church-related elementary 
and secondary schools to be violative of the Establishment Clause).  Each of these in-
volved challenges to state acts, not congressional statutes, but the same tests have been 
applied in Establishment Clause challenges to Acts of Congress.  See, e.g., Salazar v. Buo-
no, 559 U.S. 700 (2010) (considering the constitutionality of a congressional enactment 
addressing the Mojave Memorial Cross); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 
1 (2004) (considering the constitutionality of the “under God” language in the Pledge of 
Allegiance added by a near-unanimous act of Congress in 1954). 
172 Hessick, supra note 35, at 1466 (“These laws provide opportunity for the Supreme Court 
to reconsider its precedents and allow for the continued development of constitutional 
law.”); Thayer, supra note 1, at 150 (“[T]he ultimate question is not what is the true 
meaning of the constitution, but whether legislation is sustainable or not.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
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that they are unfounded, can be accommodated, or require only lim-
ited exceptions. 
A.  An Adjustable Presumption of Constitutionality Would Be Untethered 
from Text and Original Meaning 
An initial objection is that applying an adjustable presumption 
would be illegitimate because constitutional adjudication is and 
should be determinate, without reference to external factors such as 
the margin of passage.  The Constitution has a fixed content, and the 
Court’s duty is to (a) ascertain what the Constitution allows, (b) as-
certain what the statute means, and (c) determine whether B is with-
in A.173  Any presumption or “thumb on the scale” is therefore simply 
illegitimate and contrary to the rule-of-law principles at the core of 
the American constitutional republic. 
But, the claim that the Constitution always has a determinate 
meaning is wrong.  Constitutional adjudication is indeterminate—not 
in all or perhaps even most cases, but in a fair number of the ones 
that make it to the Supreme Court, and usually in the most difficult 
and politically charged ones.174  Judicial interpretations of what the 
Constitution allows, as well as jurisprudential theories of how to in-
terpret the Constitution, observably vary widely over time, and also 
within the Court at any given time.175  Interpretive pluralism has been 
widely acknowledged and sometimes celebrated.176  While constitu-
tional theorists (and some Justices) put forth one particular interpre-
tive theory or subtheory as the only legitimate way to read the Consti-
 
173 See Karlan, supra note 13, at 41 (arguing that the Roberts Court’s approach to judicial re-
view is essentially that of United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936), in which the Court 
asserted that what it does is to “‘lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside 
the statute which is challenged’ in order ‘to decide whether the latter squares with the 
former.’”). 
174 See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 8, at 83 (noting, as one of Thayer’s arguments for his def-
erential standard, that “many constitutional questions have more than one reasonable an-
swer”). 
175 See, e.g., JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY:  THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4–5 (2005) (“There is no law of constitutional interpretation.”).  
Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, supra note 121, with STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:  
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 3 (2006) (“[C]ourts should take greater 
account of the Constitution’s democratic nature when they interpret constitutional and 
statutory texts.”).  
176 E.g., PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:  THE THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 1–119 
(1982) (describing six modalities of constitutional interpretation:  (1) structural, (2) tex-
tual, (3) ethical, (4) prudential, (5) historical, and (6) doctrinal); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 
1189–90 (1987) (identifying five types:  (1) text, (2) Framers’ intentions, (3) purposive 
arguments, (4) precedent, and (5) policy arguments). 
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tution, the Supreme Court, taken collectively, rarely (if ever) applies 
only one analytical mode to read the Constitution, and the predomi-
nant mode of analysis applied by the Court changes over time. 
In addition, even within dominant theories, there is significant 
indeterminacy that could accommodate majority views as expressed 
in legislation enacted by large majorities of the people’s representa-
tives.  To take the example of Originalism,177 the theory was originally 
offered as a means to restrict judges perceived to be freewheeling, 
but it is acknowledged now that taking Originalism seriously results in 
less constraint on judicial behavior, at least in the sense of restraining 
judges from invalidating democratic acts.178  As the theory shifted 
from “original intent” 179to “original public meaning,” 180and forked 
into various subtheories, including the new “living originalism,”181 it 
has gained adherents at the expense of coherence.  Sometimes, suffi-
cient historical materials are simply lacking or conflicting enough 
that they allow drawing two different supportable interpretive conclu-
sions.182  Even when there are ample materials, in application, 
Originalism can produce two different answers from two different 
Justices.183 
 
177 Originalist theory is a useful example since that theory (specifically, the “original public 
meaning” subtheory) is currently quite popular in academic discourse.  See, e.g., Richard 
S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 703, 704 (2009) (“In this ‘new and improved’ form, originalism has (mainly) carried 
the day:  ‘We are all originalists now.’” (quoting Jeffrey Rosen, Originalist Sin:  The 
Achievement of Antonin Scalia, and Its Intellectual Incoherence, NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1997, at 
26)).  There are still, however, prominent and assertive deniers.  E.g., Mitchell N. Ber-
man, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (“That original intents and mean-
ings matter is not enough to render originalism true.”). 
178 See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609 
(2004) (tracing the evolution from “old originalism” grounded in twin goals of restrain-
ing judicial discretion and deference to legislative majorities to a “new originalism” that 
“does not require that judges get out of the way of legislatures . . . [but] requires that 
judges uphold the original Constitution—nothing more, but also nothing less”). 
179  Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO L.J. 713, 720 (2011).  
180  Id. at 721, 729. 
181 See id. at 725–30 (discussing the evolution of Originalist theory from a focus on “the actu-
al, subjective, and narrow to the hypothetical, objective, and abstract.”).  See generally JACK 
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2009). 
182 See, e.g., Joel Alicea & Donald L. Drakeman, The Limits of New Originalism, 15 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1161, 1161 (examining Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), as a 
“real example of the impossibility of a New Originalist interpretation when the historical 
materials provide clear evidence of equally plausible but conflicting meanings” and sug-
gesting resorting to “Old Originalism’s” focus on Founders’ intent as a solution). 
183 For example, in Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011), Justice Scalia con-
cluded that violent video games sold to minors are protected speech based, at least par-
tially, on “what James Madison thought about violence.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 
17, Schwarzenegger v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 130 S. Ct. 2398 (2010) (No. 08-1448); see also 
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Since constitutional interpretation is debatable and shifting, with 
arguments about what interpretive theory to apply and about particu-
lar results under a single theory, there is ample room for deference 
to the democratic will, specifically in the form of a presumption of 
constitutionality that increases based on the margin of statutory pas-
sage.184  In determining what the Constitution means, especially when 
the answer is inconclusive, the people themselves should have an on-
going say, and the main mechanism that the Constitution allows is 
through their elected representatives.185  When a statute is approved 
by an overwhelming margin of voters, the people, through their rep-
resentatives, are vocally asserting that the act is (or should be) within 
the bounds of the Constitution, and courts should respect this asser-
tion by applying a stronger presumption of constitutionality. 
Thus, adopting a presumption of constitutionality that increases 
with the margin of statutory passage would allow a democratic voice 
in constitutional interpretation and application, but in a nuanced 
way, that would most strongly check the Court when the popular 
voice is strongest.  It is important to distinguish this, then, from a 
“Living Constitution” theory that allows judges to update the mean-
ing of constitutional texts based on their own ideas about what the 
Constitution should allow given modern realities.186  To the extent 
 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2736 (focusing on the lack of any “longstanding tradition” of “restrict-
ing children’s access to depictions of violence”).  Justice Thomas, in contrast, concluded 
that the statute was constitutional because “the founding generation would not have un-
derstood ‘the freedom of speech’ to include a right to speak to children without going 
through their parents.”  Id. at 2759 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Brown is a particularly sali-
ent example because Thomas and Scalia are generally perceived to broadly agree on in-
terpretive methodology, political preferences, and actual results.  See also District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Justice Scalia’s majority opinion and Justice 
Stevens’s dissent arriving at opposite conclusions about the original meaning or under-
standing of the Second Amendment). 
184 Cf., e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity:  Originalism and the Possibility of Constitution-
al Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147, 167–68 (2012) (reviewing JACK M. BALKIN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION:  POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011) and JACK 
M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011)) (describing an approach to originalism that al-
lows a “construction zone” that can accommodate other values or approaches “when the 
original meaning of the text is vague or open-textured”). 
185 See, e.g., Thayer, supra note 1, at 144 (“[T]he constitution often admits of different inter-
pretations; that there is often a range of choice and judgment; . . . in such cases the con-
stitution . . . leaves open this range of choice; and that whatever choice is rational is con-
stitutional.”).  Admittedly, in Thayer’s view, at its strongest, the deference should extend 
even to cases in which a particular interpretive theory does produce a likely answer, so 
long as the judge is not sure that it is correct “beyond a rational doubt.”  See Posner, supra 
note 23, at 537; Thayer, supra note 1, at 144.  For the argument that the presumption of 
constitutionality should extend not only to factual adjudication, but also to interpretive 
deference, see supra Part III.B. 
186 See SCALIA, supra note 121, at 44–45; Rehnquist, supra note 121, at 695. 
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that an adjustable presumption allows for constitutional evolution or 
flexibility, it would be driven by the people’s representatives, rather 
than the courts.187 
A related objection would be the textual argument that it is illegit-
imate to give a stronger presumption of constitutionality to more 
popular laws because the Constitution requires only bicameral major-
ity passage and the president’s signature.188  Any rule that gives more 
force to statutes based on exceeding that threshold, therefore, vio-
lates the Constitution itself.189  But, the argument is not that a narrow-
ly passed statute is not law or “less law” than an overwhelmingly 
passed one.  It is instead about an analytical approach the Court 
should apply to validly enacted laws when facing difficult questions 
about whether they are constitutional. 
Further, judicial review is itself extratextual.  The Constitution 
prescribes no rules or guidelines for how it should be exercised or 
how to interpret the Constitution.190  Specifically, the presumption of 
constitutionality itself is extratextual.191  Thus, objections to the ar-
gument based on the idea that the Constitution has a fixed textual 
meaning would bar applying a presumption of constitutionality at all.  
If the courts’ duty is simply to ascertain the meaning of the Constitu-
tion (by text or original intent) and evaluate the statute accordingly, 
then there should be no room for a presumption one way or another.  
Certainly, this argument has been made—for example, Randy Bar-
nett has argued that Originalism requires no deference to legislative 
acts and even that a countervailing “presumption of liberty” should 
be adopted under which statutes are presumed to be invalid.192 
But, this does not seem to be the view taken by the Court.  The 
Court has said that it does presume congressional acts to be constitu-
tional.193  Additionally, the Court already exercises discretion in decid-
ing when to apply the presumption (generally based on the type of 
constitutional challenge being asserted).194  There is thus no princi-
 
187 See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
549, 550 (2009) (arguing that living constitution theory “is not primarily addressed to 
judges but to all citizens”). 
188 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
189 Cf. Burke, supra note 59, at 76–77 (arguing that the presumption of constitutionality is 
itself illegitimate for these reasons). 
190 See, e.g., RUBENFELD, supra note 175, at 4–5. 
191 Randy E. Barnett, Necessary and Proper, 44 UCLA L. REV. 745, 793 (1997) (criticizing the 
presumption of constitutionality because it is “extratextual”). 
192 BARNETT, supra note 69, at 229, 260. 
193 See supra Part I.B. 
194 See id. 
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pled reason that if the Court is going to apply the presumption, it 
should not apply it in an improved way by adjusting it based on the 
margin of statutory passage.  Further, as discussed, the Court has fre-
quently been perceived as arriving at its decisions with an unacknowl-
edged eye on the popularity of the statute under review, so it is better 
for the Court to acknowledge as much in its opinions.195 
Another textualist objection would be that looking at vote counts 
would amount, in a way, to an impermissible inquiry into legislative 
intent beyond the plain meaning of the statutory text.196  But, the 
proposed adjustable presumption does not necessarily turn on what 
any individual member, or the collective of “yea”-voting members, 
thought about the bill.  It rests, only in part, on the existing assump-
tion that Congress collectively does consider the Constitution when it 
legislates. 
B.  An Adjustable Presumption Would Be Unprecedented 
Despite the justifications for an adjustable presumption of consti-
tutionality discussed above, the federal courts have never explicitly 
resorted to vote counting as an analytical framework for deciding 
how much deference to give a statute.  This does not mean that it 
would be completely unprecedented to rely on the margin of pas-
sage, however.  At various times, the Court or individual Justices have 
referred to “overwhelming” margins of passage as carrying analytical, 
or at least rhetorical, weight that should prompt more deference to, 
or more evidence before invalidating, a statute.197  Moreover, the po-
 
195 See supra Part II.C. 
196 See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 121, at 31 (“I object to the use of legislative history on princi-
ple, since I reject intent of the legislature as the proper criterion of the law.”); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
59 (1988) (criticizing judicial reliance on legislative intent in statutory interpretation). 
197 See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1823–24 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[I]t is 
noteworthy that Congress, in which our country’s religious diversity is well represented, 
passed this law by overwhelming majorities . . . .”); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 
292, 294 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing to overwhelming votes in favor of Sen-
tencing Guidelines as demonstrating the Court’s error in holding that they should not be 
binding); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308–09 (1966) (noting, in opinion 
upholding the Voting Rights Act of 1965, that “the verdict of both chambers was over-
whelming”); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002) (“The evidence carries 
even greater force when it is noted that the legislatures that have addressed the issue have 
voted overwhelmingly in favor of the prohibition.”); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 
U.S. 377, 394 (2000) (“And although majority votes do not, as such, defeat First Amend-
ment protections, the statewide vote on Proposition A certainly attested to the perception 
relied upon here:  ‘[A]n overwhelming 74 percent of the voters of Missouri determined 
that contribution limits are necessary to combat corruption and the appearance there-
of.’”); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 621 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Although 
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litical branches have also endorsed the idea that the Court should de-
fer especially to statutes that pass with substantial majority support.198 
On the other hand, some Justices—particularly in recent years—
have affirmatively rejected the idea that the degree of support for the 
statute should produce any greater judicial deference.199  But, the 
modest point here is simply that it would not be entirely unprece-
dented to consult the margin of statutory passage as a relevant fact 
affecting how strongly the Court should presume that a statute is con-
stitutional. 
Further, the fact that the courts have not historically proclaimed 
the importance of the margin of passage in applying a very strong 
presumption of constitutionality does not mean that there is no his-
torical precedent for a very robust presumption.  Instead, although 
resort to the margin of passage has not been an explicit analytical 
tool, the Court for much of its history was far more deferential in its 
review of all federal statutes than it has been in modern times.200  Alt-
hough the power of judicial review to invalidate federal statutes was 
asserted as early as Marbury v. Madison, the practice of actually invali-
dating federal statutes for unconstitutionality was quite rare, and the 
rhetoric used to describe the presumption of constitutionality was a 
much more robust “beyond a rational doubt.”201  Thus, in the past, 
the Court seemed to apply a stout presumption of constitutionality to 
all statutes.  Incorporating an adjustable presumption of constitu-
 
the Establishment Clause, including its secular purpose requirement, was of substantial 
concern to the legislators, they eventually voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Balanced 
Treatment Act . . . .”); Newdow v. Rio Linda Union Sch. Dist., 597 F.3d 1007, 1034 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (“[G]iven the margins by which the 2002 Act passed, it is clear that virtually all 
of the members of Congress agreed we had misinterpreted the purpose of the words ‘un-
der God.’”). 
198 See, e.g., Michael A. Memoli, Obama:  Overturning healthcare law would be ‘extraordinary step,’ 
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/02/news/la-pn-obama-
confident-supreme-court-will-uphold-healthcare-law-20120402 (quoting President 
Obama’s statement that it would be an “extraordinary step” for the Court to overturn a 
law passed “by a strong majority of a democratically elected Congress”).  The House ma-
jority actually was narrow, but the point is the President’s rhetorical appeal to the 
strength of the majority vote as a ground for backing down the Court. 
199 See, e.g., Salazar, 130 S. Ct. at 1841 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]f we were debating 
whether Congress had a religious purpose in passing the transfer statute, I would contest the 
relevance of the vote count to that inquiry . . . .” (emphasis added)); Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment at 51, NAMUDNO v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (No. 08-322) (Justice Scalia 
suggesting that a unanimous or near unanimous vote should be a cause for particular 
skepticism, not particular deference); Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Shelby County 
v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96) (same). 
200 See Posner, supra note 23, at 534 (tracing the evolution from extreme deference to the 
current state in which there are “no orthodox Thayerians” on the federal bench). 
201 See supra Part I.B (tracing the weakening and narrowing of the presumption). 
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tionality based on the margin of statutory passage would revive this 
level of deference in a limited way and swing the pendulum back to-
wards heightened deference for those statutes that deserve it most, 
for the reasons explained above. 
C.  An Adjustable Presumption Would Harm Judicial Legitimacy by Making 
It Appear That the Court Bows to Public Pressure 
An objection to the argument for increased legitimacy202 would be 
that adopting a presumption of constitutionality that increases based 
on the margin of passage would actually decrease the Court’s legiti-
macy because it would create a perception that the Court was re-
sponding or caving in to public pressure—that the Court was behav-
ing as a political actor.  The best articulation of this argument by the 
Court itself was in Casey, in which the Court explained at length why 
adherence to unpopular precedents is especially important to pre-
serve the legitimacy of the Court:  “[T]o overrule under fire in the 
absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed de-
cision would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious ques-
tion.”203  If the Court started looking at the margin of passage when 
reviewing statutory constitutionality, the argument would run, it 
would lose legitimacy in the eyes of the public because it would be 
seen as bowing to “mob rule” rather than making neutral rulings 
based on what the Constitution really says. 
There are a few responses to this objection.  One is that there is 
not really any good reason to think that the people would think less 
of the Court for upholding a popular statute, even if doing so re-
quired revising or overruling the Court’s own precedents.  To the 
contrary, the evidence of recent polls seems to indicate that popular 
opinion of the Court is diminished by the perception that members 
of the Court decide cases based on their own political preferences, 
for extra-legal reasons, in defiance of the majority will.204 
Another is that since considering the margin of passage would be 
brought in to the family of legitimate analytic considerations—on the 
theories of respect for majoritarianism and for the strength of Con-
gress’s own assessment of the statute’s constitutionality—there actual-
 
202 See supra Part II.C. 
203 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992).  This is the “double-
down” theory of stare decisis—if a decision proves unpopular, the Court must be especial-
ly committed to the prior precedent for fear that it will be perceived as weak if it caves 
and overrules itself. 
204 See supra note 104 (describing two recent polls reflecting historically low approval of the 
Court). 
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ly would be less danger of the Court being perceived as having illegit-
imately caved to public pressure.205  Considering public pressure 
would (and should) be a legitimate constitutional argument—at least 
in the limited sense of the will of the people as expressed in a statute 
overwhelmingly adopted according to prescribed constitutional pro-
cedures by the people’s duly elected representatives.206  Thus, adopt-
ing an adjustable presumption of constitutionality based on the mar-
gin of passage would improve, not undermine, the Court’s legitimacy 
with the public. 
D.  Margin of Passage Is Not a Good Proxy for Congressional or Popular 
Endorsement of Constitutionality (Hasty Statutes and Omnibus Bills) 
A further objection is that applying a blanket adjustable presump-
tion would be impracticable or unwise because of the many variables 
that can affect the number of votes for a particular statute, or a par-
ticular provision in a statute, has received.  This objection has at least 
two distinct aspects.  One is a general objection:  if members of Con-
gress actually do not consider the constitutionality of legislation when 
voting for it, then there should not be any deference to a larger ma-
jority’s vote to pass the legislation based on the theory that it reflects 
a more vocal assertion by the people’s representatives of the legisla-
tion’s constitutionality.  The second is a more specific objection that, 
even if Congress generally considers constitutionality when it passes 
legislation, there are many instances when it does not consider the 
constitutionality of specific pieces of hastily passed legislation, or of 
specific provisions in much more wide-ranging bills, which later be-
come the subject of specific constitutional challenges.207 
As to the general objection, the first response is that the argu-
ments for applying an adjustable presumption of constitutionality do 
not depend solely on the argument that Congress has specifically 
 
205 See supra Part II.C. 
206 “Public pressure” could also take the form of opinion polls or speech criticizing the 
Court’s decision.  But, I do not argue that the Court could or should legitimately consid-
er these forms of public pressure in deciding how to apply the presumption of constitu-
tionality.  See Or Bassok, The Two Countermajoritarian Difficulties, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 333 (2012) (identifying a “second countermajoritarian difficulty” in the form of the 
Court’s rulings contradicting majority preferences as expressed in political polls).  In-
stead, if there are defects in how well Congress’s acts reflect popular opinion, popular 
pressure should be exerted to cure those defects directly. 
207 See United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 449 (1953) (“The rational and 
practical force of the presumption is at its maximum only when it appears that the precise 
point in issue here has been considered by Congress and has been explicitly and deliber-
ately resolved.”). 
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considered a statute’s constitutionality before passing it.  Instead, as 
discussed above, there are several arguments for applying such a pre-
sumption independent of such consideration—such as democratic 
concerns inherently raised by thwarting the will of large majorities, 
the Constitution’s own privileging of supermajorities, and academic 
arguments that supermajorities tend to produce superior laws.208  
These arguments suggest that, even if Congress does not explicitly 
consider constitutional interpretation when it legislates, passage of a 
statute by a large majority vote reflects a strong democratic opinion 
that the statute should be adopted, and that the Constitution allows 
it. 
Further, while not uncontroversial, there is significant evidence 
that Congress does indeed consider the constitutionality of legislation 
that it enacts.209  Moreover, the Court itself assumes as much—this is 
one of the substantial bases for the Court’s practice of affording a 
presumption of constitutionality to federal legislation.210  Thus, as a 
general matter, it does not seem incorrect to apply an adjustable pre-
sumption of constitutionality based, at least in part, on the theory 
that Congress considers constitutionality when it legislates and that a 
larger margin of statutory passage reflects a more ringing endorse-
ment of a statute’s constitutionality. 
To the extent that the objection needs to be accommodated fur-
ther than this response, it would be sufficient to allow that the pre-
sumption could be rebutted, or overcome, by a specific showing that 
Congress legislated with affirmative disregard for the constitutionality 
of the statute.211  This would be a difficult showing to make—it will be 
the rare occasion where Congress passes a statute saying “the Consti-
tution be damned.” But, it might come into play in an instance where 
Congress legislates in specific defiance of a constitutional restriction 
as interpreted by the Court.212  This leads into a discussion of two par-
 
208 See supra Part II.A. 
209 See supra notes 88–89. 
210 See supra note 88. 
211 There is significant debate about what materials may be legitimately consulted to ascer-
tain congressional intent.  See supra note 196.  Without wading into that discussion, under 
this Article’s argument, it would be a rare case where the Court should second-guess 
Congress’s level of consideration of constitutionality and that very strong evidence should 
be required.  For a contrary argument—that Congress should say more about constitu-
tional interpretation, and that the Court should scrutinize these statements, see Volokh, 
supra note 88, at 212–222. 
212 One example would be Congress’s attempt to override Employment Division, Department of 
Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), by passing the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (Nov. 16, 1993).  The Court struck 
down RFRA, in part, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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ticular types of instances in which examining the background and 
legislative history of the statute might be relevant to the application 
of the adjustable presumption. 
1. Hasty Statutes 
One such instance is legislation passed quickly in a time of crisis 
and perhaps without serious consideration given to its constitutionali-
ty.  Two notable recent examples are enactments passed in the wake 
of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to respond to urgent na-
tional security concerns raised by that event:  (1) the Authorization 
for Use of Military Force,213 which has been cited by the government 
as authority for many of the steps taken in the so-called “War on Ter-
ror” that have been the subject of significant constitutional challeng-
es, and (2) the USA PATRIOT Act214, which was also passed to address 
domestic issues related to national security and which has been sub-
jected to many constitutional challenges in the courts.  Critics have 
charged that these enactments were passed in a panic, without due 
consideration to their constitutionality.215  In the context of this Arti-
cle’s arguments for an adjustable presumption of constitutionality, 
these could be offered as examples of instances where the Court 
should not defer more substantially to statutes passed by very large 
margins because the Court should not bend the Constitution to ac-
commodate hasty, panicked responses to crises. 
One main response to this objection is simply to deny its substan-
tive force—when Congress acts quickly and overwhelmingly to re-
spond to an urgent national crisis, the argument for deference is at 
its highest, not lowest.216  As the threat recedes and the defects in the 
legislation become more apparent, public pressure will mount to 
 
213 Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 124-25 (Sept. 14, 2011).  Approved three days after 9/11, the 
AUMF passed the House 420-1 and passed the Senate unanimously. 
214 Pub. L. 107-56, 15 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001).  The Patriot Act passed the House 357-66 
(84%) on Oct. 24, 2001 and passed the Senate 98-1 on Oct. 25, 2001. 
215 E.g., Press Release, Senator Rand Paul, Senator Rand Paul’s Letter of Opposition to the 
Patriot Act (Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://paul.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=331164 
(“Congress instead hastily passed a long-standing wish list of power grabs like warrantless 
searches and roving wiretaps . . . .  It is not acceptable to willfully ignore the most basic 
provisions of our Constitution—in this case—the Fourth and First Amendments—in the 
name of ‘security.’”). 
216 Cf., e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE:  CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 
(1998) (tracing the history of incursions on civil liberty during wartime). 
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change or repeal the unwise legislation.217  In addition, to the extent 
that hasty statutes are challenged for infringing on individuals’ fun-
damental rights, such as Fourth Amendment rights, the adjustable 
presumption as described in this Article would not apply, since those 
challenges would be outside the modern “core” of the presumption 
of constitutionality.218 
Beyond these responses, the objection should be accommodated 
only by a limited adjustment in the form of allowing the presumption 
to be rebutted or overcome only by a specific showing that Congress 
hastily passed the legislation in affirmative disregard of its obligation 
to consider constitutionality.  Not much evidence would be required 
to show that constitutionality was considered in passing the legislation 
and, therefore, that the presumption should apply. 
2. Omnibus Bills 
A second specific instance in which the presumption arguably 
should not apply would be when the challenged statutory provision 
was passed as a small, perhaps obscure part of a much larger bill.  
Here, the argument would be that when a challenged provision was 
included as an afterthought or overlooked part of a much broader 
bill, it cannot be said to have been specifically considered by Con-
gress and vetted for passing constitutional muster.  That is, the fact 
that a provision was in a statute that passed by an overwhelming mar-
gin has very little to say about Congress’s opinion of a particular pro-
vision’s constitutionality when that provision was a small and unim-
portant part of a much larger bill.219 
There are several responses to this objection.  First, it does not go 
to the core of the argument.  That is, even if some statutory challeng-
es might fall subject to this problem, it would not go to all of them.  
Some statutes, at least, are subject to significant deliberation before 
their enactment and are enacted with serious consideration and de-
 
217 Currently, the rising and bipartisan voices of criticisms of the spying policies of American 
intelligence agencies suggest that public opinion may (hopefully) be shifting towards re-
peal of some of the excesses of the Patriot Act and secret surveillance courts. 
218 See supra Part III.B. 
219 Justice Stevens leveled essentially this criticism in Salazar v. Buono, criticizing the concur-
rence’s suggestion that Congress’s attempt at a solution to the Mojave Cross dispute was 
entitled to deference and respect because “a provision tucked silently into an appropria-
tions bill” differs from “a major statute debated and developed over many years,” and 
“[o]ne cannot infer much of anything about the land-transfer provision from the fact that 
an appropriations bill passed by an overwhelming majority.”  Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 
1803, 1840, 1841 n.12 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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bate about whether they are constitutional.220  In those instances, the 
arguments for an adjustable presumption of constitutionality based 
on the margin of passage would still apply with full force.  Second, 
the Court does not generally look behind legislative votes to deter-
mine whether a particular part of a statute really was supported by 
every legislator who voted for the statute.  Further, the argument de-
pends only in part on the premise that Congress must be assumed to 
carefully consider constitutionality when it legislates.221  As argued 
above, the mere fact of endorsement by a very large majority should 
itself prompt the Court to afford substantial deference to a statutory 
provision.222 
Finally, to the extent that the objection does have force, it could 
be accommodated in judicial development and application of the ad-
justable presumption.  That is, the presumption could be perhaps re-
butted by a showing that the provision under attack was added as an 
afterthought or without significant deliberation by Congress.  Con-
gress, in response, could be more systematic about engaging in con-
stitutional interpretation when it legislates.223  Or, a provision added 
by a specific amendment to a wide-ranging piece of legislation could 
be examined to determine the vote margin by which that particular 
amendment was added, and that could be factored into the analysis 
of how strongly the court should presume that the statute is constitu-
tional. 
E.  There Is No Single Margin of Passage Because of Bicameral Discrepancies 
Another practical objection would be based on the observation 
that statutes can, and do, pass by different margins in the two houses 
of Congress, posing difficulties for a theory that adjusts the presump-
tion of constitutionality based on the margin of statutory passage in 
Congress.  This raises questions about which margin should matter 
more and what version of the presumption should apply when, for 
example, the House passes a piece of legislation by a supermajority 
and the Senate passes it by only a few votes. 
There are a few responses to this objection.  One is that this objec-
tion would only carry weight when the statutory margin of passage 
 
220 See supra notes 88–89. 
221 Only the argument made in Part II.B, supra, relies directly on this assumption; those in 
II.A and II.C–E do not. 
222 See supra Part II.A. 
223 See Volokh, supra note 88, at 212–22 (discussing and suggesting improvements in the use 
of constitutional authority statements as a tool to demonstrate congressional constitu-
tional deliberation). 
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differs significantly between houses and so does not defeat the core 
of the argument.  It would be useful to know how often there is a sub-
stantial difference in the margin of passage between the House and 
Senate, and whether there are any systematic trends in the discrepan-
cy.224 
As for those cases in which there is a meaningful difference be-
tween the margin of passage, a few responses or accommodations 
could be made.  One would be simply to afford a presumption based 
on the highest (or lowest) margin of passage between the two houses.  
Tying the presumption to the highest margin of passage would tend 
to afford more deference to federal statutes, tying it to the lowest 
less.225  Another would be to only apply the maximum-strength ver-
sion of the presumption if both houses passed the statute by greater 
than two-thirds majorities. 
An alternative approach would be to privilege the margin of pas-
sage in the House over that in the Senate.  The virtue of this ap-
proach would be to tie the presumption afforded to the statute to the 
vote in the more democratically representative house, which would 
be responsive to critics who attack the Senate as a backwards, un-
democratic institution.226  The problem would be that it would give 
more interpretive weight to House votes than Senate votes, which 
would at least be in tension with the Constitution’s bicameralism re-
quirements, which mostly do not distinguish between the two houses’ 
powers and abilities in passing legislation.227  For that reason, I would 
not favor this approach.228 
 
224 This would be the margin measured by percentages, and not raw vote numbers. 
225 Since this Article endorses the theory out of a preference for more deference to federal 
statutes, I would favor the former approach, but it is not necessary to adopt that approach 
in order to accept the basic argument. 
226 See, e.g., LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 58. 
227 There are exceptions, most notably the House’s sole power to originate spending bills.  
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.  But generally, our system is not like ones those (like the 
United Kingdom’s) where the more representative house has much more power to enact 
legislation and the less representative house has a merely advisory role. 
228 In addition, it may be that the Senate is actually not as unrepresentative in practice as its 
theoretical critics contend.  One recent study suggests, in the limited context of examin-
ing filibusters between 1991 and 2001, that at least on average the number of Senate votes 
cast in favor of cloture (54.5) roughly corresponds to the share of the population 
(54.9%) represented by Senators voting for cloture.  See Eidelson, supra note 80, at 1004.  
But see id. at 1005 (noting particular examples of filibusters where a minority thwarted the 
representatives of 60% or more of the national population). 
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F.  An Adjustable Presumption of Constitutionality Would Never Be Applied 
Because the Court Would Not Voluntarily Limit Its Own Interpretive 
Supremacy 
Finally, there is the simple, practical objection that even if the 
theory is nice, it is essentially irrelevant because the Court is very un-
likely to adopt and endorse any doctrine that tends to limit its own 
powers to invalidate federal statutes.  As Judge Posner points out, 
there are no Thayerians on the Court now,229 and some Justices in 
particular might be actively hostile to the notion of a doctrine that 
defers more to statutes passed by larger margins.230  Thus, there is 
simply no chance, the argument would run, that the Court would ev-
er choose to limit itself by increasing the amount of deference that it 
affords to statutes passed by Congress, because all of the members of 
the Court—despite their varying policy preferences and commit-
ments—enjoy having the power to impose those preferences and 
commitments through judicial review. 
There is some truth to this objection, but also a few reasons to 
think it is not fatal.  One is that, as Judge Posner points out—the fall 
in judicial restraint followed a rise.  That is, the level of deference af-
forded by the Court has demonstrably altered over time, and the fact 
that it has declined does not mean that it can never again rise.  Cur-
rent Justices might be convinced that popular views on interpreting 
the Constitution—as reflected in the votes of their representatives—
should be deferred to when expressed overwhelmingly; or new Justic-
es who think so could be appointed.231  Even if there are no Thayer-
ians now—that is, no Justice who defers to all statutes to that extreme 
degree—it is possible that one current Justice might accept, or some 
new Justice might embrace, that at the unanimous or supermajoritar-
 
229 Posner, supra note 23, at 537. 
230 In the oral arguments in NAMUDNO v. Holder, for example, Justice Scalia took the over-
whelming votes for renewing the Voting Rights Act as cause for suspicion, not deference.  
Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, NAMUDNO v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (No. 
08-322) (“You know, the—the Israeli Supreme Court, the Sanhedrin, used to have a rule 
that if the death penalty was pronounced unanimously, it was invalid, because there must 
be something wrong there.”).  In the follow-on case, Shelby County v. Holder, Justice Scalia 
went even further, suggesting specifically that the unanimous Senate and near-unanimous 
House votes to renew Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act should be suspect because they 
reflected “a phenomenon that is called perpetuation of racial entitlement.”  Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 47, Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (No. 12-96). 
231 Several scholars have criticized the fact that, since Justice O’Connor, the Court has had 
no members who have held elected office.  See, e.g., Karlan, supra note 13, at 5 (“[T]he 
current Supreme Court is the first in U.S. history to lack even a single member who ever 
served in elected office.”); see also VERMEULE, supra note 68, at 123–25 (arguing for in-
cluding non-lawyers on the federal bench). 
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ian extreme, Thayerian deference could be appropriate.  And, since 
many, if not the most recent, controversial invalidations of federal 
statutes have been accomplished by bare 5-4 majorities on the 
Court,232 one Justice’s adoption of the approach could be enough to 
change voting results.233 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the presumption of constitutionality 
that the Supreme Court affords to federal statutes should and can be 
adjusted so that it strengthens based on the margin of statutory pas-
sage.  Increasing the strength of the presumption based on the mar-
gin of statutory passage ameliorates countermajoritarian concerns 
about the judicial invalidation of duly enacted federal statutes in a 
way that is consistent with the majoritarian justifications for the pre-
sumption of constitutionality.  It draws support from the Constitu-
tion’s own privileging of supermajority enactments, as well as aca-
demic theories about supermajorities’ superior ability to enact good 
laws and resolve major constitutional questions.  And, it could im-
prove judicial legitimacy both by improving judicial deference to 
more popular statutes and by making explicit the Court’s widely per-
ceived tacit consideration of the level of popular support for legisla-
tion. 
This Article has also attempted to show how the presumption 
could be adjusted to increase with the margin of passage, and when 
the adjustable presumption should be applied.  The presumption, at 
the minimum, would consist of a mere tiebreaking tool, with no in-
terpretive deference for statutes passed by razor-thin margins.  It 
would strengthen through a middle ground requiring a clear or plain 
showing of unconstitutionality and affording some degree of inter-
pretive flexibility.  And, it would rise to a Thayerian maximum for 
statutes passed by a supermajority of both houses, at which the pre-
sumption would require upholding a statute, unless it can be shown 
 
232 See supra notes 124–128 (listing several of these decisions). 
233 For example, it has been suggested that Chief Justice Roberts’s vote in Sebelius, which did 
determine the result, was a switched vote and also that it was a modern-day instance of 
maximal, Thayerian deference.  See O’Neill, supra note 47, at 171(suggesting that Rob-
erts’s vote was Thayerian); Jan Crawford, Roberts switched views to uphold health care law, CBS 
NEWS (July 1, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549/roberts-
switched-views-to-uphold-health-care-law (suggesting Roberts switched); see also Caminker, 
supra note 8, at 87 (“[E]ach Justice gets to decide individually how much (if any) weight 
to give to the presumption of constitutionality in any given case . . . . Thus, the norm of 
Thayerian deference operates by . . . Justices acting atomistically . . . .”). 
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to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt and include a sig-
nificant degree of interpretive deference directing the Court to bend 
or alter its own constitutional doctrines to accommodate the statute 
under review. 
Finally, this Article has attempted to show that many of the main 
possible objections to the argument either are unfounded, can be ac-
commodated by case-by-case development of the application of the 
presumption, or require only limited exceptions or modifications to 
the application of the adjustable presumption. 
The argument opens up several areas for future inquiry.  One is to 
examine whether the adjustable presumption should apply even 
where the Court currently weakens or reverses the presumption, such 
as challenges involving enumerated or fundamental rights.  Another 
is to investigate empirically whether the Court in fact defers more to 
statutes based on margin of statutory passage—which would support 
making this tacit practice explicit by adopting an adjustable presump-
tion.  Another is to investigate the bicameralism objection—is there a 
significant, systemic discrepancy in margin of passage between the 
House and Senate, and if so, which margin should weigh more in de-
termining how strong the presumption of constitutionality should be?  
Finally, further research could investigate whether the arguments for 
applying an adjustable presumption of constitutionality to federal 
statutes also apply to state statutes, or for deferring more to executive 
actions of more popular presidents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
